

JPRS 79654

14 December 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2453

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## BRIEFS

OPEC-LDC TRADE STATISTICS--Trade between OPEC members and non-oil producing lesser developed countries (LDCs) increased sixfold in the 1970s. Exports from the non-oil LDCs to OPEC countries increased by 464 per cent, outpacing growth in their exports to the rest of the world for most of the period from 1972-1979. In a paper published in the forthcoming OPEC REVIEW, two British economists, Paul Hallwood and Stuart Sinclair, assess the nature of trade between non-oil LDCs and OPEC members. From a value of \$3.3bn in 1973, exports from non-oil producing LDCs to oil exporting countries reached \$15.2bn by 1979. For their part, oil exporting countries increased exports to non-oil LDCs from \$7.8bn in 1973 to \$46bn by 1979. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 41]

CSO: 4400/75

## BAHRAIN

### BRIEFS

NEW STEEL PLANT--Kobe Steel of Japan has been awarded a \$207m contract by the Arab Company for Iron and Steel to build a steel plant in Bahrain. Scheduled for completion in 30 months, and serviced by a dry dock, the plant will be the largest steel works in the region. It is expected to meet the entire requirements of the area. The Japanese company has also signed a contract with the Al Jazirah Contracting and Investment Company for dredging work at the port of Manama, and is to build associated docks. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 40]

CSO: 4400/75

## EGYPT

### POPE SHANUDAH'S LIFE, VIEWS EXAMINED, DISPUTE WITH AL-SADAT NOTED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 12

[Article: "Head of [Coptic] Orthodox Church: Journalist and Archeologist Dismissed by al-Sadat; Conflict Within Church Over Camp David"]

[Text] In recent years, a conflict has been going on in the Egyptian [Coptic] Orthodox Church between the Sunday Schools Movement and the Sunday school graduates on the one hand and, on the other hand, the traditionalist Christian clergymen who have controlled the church from top to bottom. One of the main figures of this struggle has been Pope Shanudah III, at one time the editor of MADARIS AL-AHAD [Sunday Schools] magazine.

What is strange is that a number of Shanudah's opponents have censured him, after Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, for getting involved in supporting the Camp David policy, the open-door economy and the special relations with the United States and Israel.

Who Is Pope Shanudah?

He is 57 years old.

He graduated from the history department of the School of Arts, Cairo University, in 1945. He taught for a short period after graduation and wrote from abroad for AL-JUMHURIYAH, which was founded by the late leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.

He attained the rank of reserve officer in the armed forces during his studies.

He acquired a diploma in archeology from Cairo University after graduating from the history department.

He gave up teaching and enrolled in the Theology College from which the [Coptic] Orthodox clergymen graduate.

He joined the service in the Sunday schools--Anba Antonius School in Shubra, Cairo.

He then became editor of MADARIS AL-AHAD magazine. The Sunday Schools Movement reflected a trend among the educated Orthodox [Copts] to create a generation of educated clergymen instead of the semieducated traditional clergymen who have controlled the Orthodox [Coptic] Church from top to bottom.

He enrolled in the Syriac [pertaining to the Syriac Church of Antioch, not Syria] Monastery with other graduates who wanted to join the monastic order. The head of the Syriac Abbey was the only one at the time who accepted and welcomed the enrollment of educated persons in the monastery.

Shanudah was preceded to the monastery by Matta al-Maskin, a graduate of the School of Pharmacology, and by Anba Samuel, the present bishop in charge of services, who graduated from the School of Law.

A conflict erupted between the educated group and the other monks and so Pope Shanudah and his two colleagues left the Syriac Monastery for another monastery near al-Fayyum desert.

But another conflict soon erupted between Shanudah and Matta al-Maskin, and this motivated Shanudah to return to the Syriac Monastery.

Those connected with the church say that the reasons for the conflict between the two are not fully clear but that it is most likely that the conflict resulted from Shanudah's excessive inclination toward ascetism and seclusion--something that provoked Matta al-Maskin's objection.

#### Start of Conflict

In 1961-62, the late Patriarch Kirillus VI ordained Shanudah general bishop in charge of educational affairs in the Orthodox [Coptic] Church.

After his ordination, Shanudah engaged in extensive activity giving lectures and sermons, and this gained him strong popularity among members of the Orthodox Church.

Patriarch Kirillus VI became annoyed with Shanudah's activities and asked him to stop lecturing and to return to the monastery.

Shanudah's popularity among the Orthodox did not come to an end during his retreat in the monastery. Thousands used to go to him daily in defiance of the patriarch's decision and in support of the bishop.

After the death of former Patriarch Yusab, Egyptian Church authorities asked that the elections for a new patriarch be delayed until the election bylaws were amended to prevent the Sunday Schools representatives from attaining the position of patriarch. The Ministry of Interior (under Zakariya Muhyi al-Din) responded to the demand at the time and the bylaws were amended so that balloting could be conducted, for the first time, among three candidates. The bylaws also set the candidate's age requirement in such a way as to exceed the age of

the "dangerous trio"--namely, Shanudah, Matta al-Maskin and Samuel, who belonged to the Sunday Schools Movement.

Thus, the late Kirillus VI, who had ordained Shanudah a bishop and then disagreed with him, won the position of patriarch.

After Kirillus' death, Anba Shanudah was one of the elected three (even though he did not win the largest number of votes) and won by the ballot. He was installed patriarch and after his installation he instructed that the title be changed from patriarch to pope.

#### Unforgivable Mistakes

Those close to Pope Shanudah censure him for his individualistic inclination, which he gained from the Sunday Schools Movement. They say that he listens to others well but does not take their opinion most of the time.

They also say that his individualism and his failure to make use of advice prompt him at times to focus on marginal and futile issues.

One of his mistakes, which the enlightened members of the church do not forgive him, is his involvement in adopting a declared political position toward issues that are the subject of dispute among Egyptians, such as the Camp David policies, the issue of the open-door economy and the special relations with the United States and Israel.

As for religious issues concerning the Christians, the enlightened censure him for his excessive strictness and his insistence on following the letter of the church's teachings without any consideration for the new conditions in Egypt and the world and for the special cases of some church members. One of these issues concerns the Christians' [Copts'] rights to get a divorce under circumstances in which it is impossible for the two sides to live together. The former patriarch had permitted this right of divorce under special circumstances. But Pope Shanudah has totally abolished this right and has not even acknowledged those special cases that had been approved by the previous patriarch.

One thing that draws attention to the individualism of Pope Shanudah, who has been a member of the Journalists Union since he was editor of MADARIS AL-AHAD magazine, is that he still lists his name as the chief editor of an ordinary and extremely modest publication consisting of several pages and called MAJALLAT AL-KARAZAH.

After a period of firm relations with President al-Sadat during which he supported al-Sadat's political positions in the wake of his visit to occupied Jerusalem, the situation has now ended up in total estrangement because of Pope Shanudah's protests over some sectarian incidents last year and because of his retreat to the monastery and his refusal to celebrate the [Christmas] holiday.

President al-Sadat has launched a violent campaign against Pope Shanudah in his speeches and statements and has accused him of attempting to set up a Christian state in Upper Egypt, with Asyut as its capital.

The main motive behind President al-Sadat's wrath is his belief that the pope's position is what prompted demonstrations hostile to him during his visit to the United States.

8494

CSO: 4504/56



EGYPT

MUBARAK COULD SHOW INDEPENDENCE FROM SADAT BY CLOSING U.S. BASES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 243, 17 Oct 81 pp 10-11

[Article by Nabil Khuri: "Egypt: Shadow President"]

[Text] Before AL-MUSTAQBAL was published, I had gone on a tour of most of the Arab capitals. The tour involved a combination of preparations for publication of AL-MUSTAQBAL, such as opening offices, concluding contracts with reporters and correspondents and meeting some Arab officials to explain to them the idea and the dimensions involved in the publication of the first Arab magazine in exile after more than a half a century.

I had to stop in Cairo and one of the people I met there was Usamah al-Baz, then undersecretary in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Isma'il Fahmi was the minister [of foreign affairs] at the time. Of course, there was no Camp David and no al-Sadat visit to Jerusalem then and Egypt was still with the Arabs and in the Arab battle against Israel.

After publication of AL-MUSTAQBAL in early 1977, I met with Usamah al-Baz in Paris more than once when he came to the French capital in the company of Isma'il Fahmi.

We--Fahmi, al-Baz and the writer of these lines--had more than one session and one discussion on Arab policy--developments in the situation and the Geneva conference, which was most ardently supported by Egypt and by Fahmi.

Suddenly, al-Sadat went to Jerusalem and the world turned upside down.

Isma'il Fahmi resigned and began to write for AL-MUSTAQBAL.

Usamah al-Baz disappeared.

And AL-MUSTAQBAL began its campaign against Anwar al-Sadat.

One day, the telephone in my house rang and the speaker on the other end was Usamah al-Baz. I was astonished.



I wanted to avoid a conversation because al-Baz represented to me al-Sadat's new Egypt, which I don't know and which is on its way to concluding peace with Israel. Al-Baz insisted that we meet.

He said: I am here in the company of Vice President Husni Mubarak. Why don't we meet?

I tried to decline.

He went on: Why don't we meet and you can tell his excellency the vice president frankly of the Arab opinion of what al-Sadat has done. We need those who will familiarize us with the other viewpoint.

I again declined.

He went on: Are you afraid of a confrontation, of a dialog?

I went to meet Husni Mubarak and Usamah al-Baz.

There was no dialog. There was a battle in which I stated my opinion and the Arab opinion regarding al-Sadat with all the emotions of that phase.

Husni Mubarak was no less emotional and went to the extent of accusing AL-MUSTAQBAL of being an agent of some Arab regimes.

At this point, I exploded, saying: "If you consider AL-MUSTAQBAL's opposition to al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and its rejection of Camp David 'agency,' then what is the description that can be applied to the visit of the president of the biggest Arab state to Israel, what can we call Camp David...and what...?"

Mubarak interrupted me to say: "We have done this for the sake of the Arabs and for Palestine and time will prove this."

I said: "You have done no more than to isolate Egypt from the Arabs, to pull Egypt out of the battle and to give Israel its main dream of waging its war against the Arabs without Egypt."

He said: "You are wrong and time will prove this to you. Let the Arabs come forward with a better solution and we will march behind them."

I said: "Camp David is no solution. It is capitulation."

He again interrupted me: "You, the Arabs, don't understand Egypt's position. Naturally, you cannot and you dare not publish Egypt's complete viewpoint..."

I replied: "Please don't challenge me. I am fully prepared to publish all you say, on condition that you put it in the form of an article and that we answer it."

Mubarak said: "I am not good at writing. But why shouldn't Usamah write the article?"

And so it was.

The article was published on 25 March 1979 under the title "Egypt's View of the Situation" and I answered the article with one of my own published in the same edition under the title "AL-MUSTAQBAL's View of the Situation."

The article generated a major uproar and its publication was considered a form of daring close to madness, especially in the state of wrath and turmoil in which the Arab world was living.

The reactions came in rapid succession and could possibly have continued for a long time had it not been for the quick development of events, which proved that the "Egyptian view" inspiring al-Baz' article did not reflect reality.

Camp David ended with a "separate peace" and the Palestinian people's rights, self-rule and the Palestinian state have continued to be mere ink on paper.

What did al-Baz say in his article and what has actually happened?

Al-Baz said:

"Egypt has not relinquished any Palestinian right because neither Egypt nor others have the power to relinquish these rights and because we have no interest in adopting such a position. It is no secret that Egypt's interest and Palestine's interest are identical to a degree unparalleled in the relationship between Palestine and any other Arab country with common borders with Israel. We have a definite interest in the rise of a Palestinian state capable of confronting the Israelis culturally and economically in this area, which is directly connected with our strategic security."

Where does Egypt now stand vis-a-vis these statements and has it mentioned the "independent Palestinian state" even once?

Al-Baz also said:

"In accordance with the Camp David framework, the Palestinian self-rule government is supposed to replace the Israeli military government and the civilian administration this government controls. Legally, this means that the self-rule government will assume all the powers of the abolished government without any bargaining."

Where does this concept of "self-rule" stand vis-a-vis the concept that Israel is projecting now?

Al-Baz went on to say:

"Israel knows quite well that Egypt cannot accept a separate peace treaty with it and that this Egyptian position emanates not only from a commitment we have undertaken but also from an objective assessment of the Egyptian interest itself. Israel also knows that if it doesn't cooperate in setting up a real self-rule with broad powers, then we will have another bone to pick with it."

"Israel knows that in refusing to acknowledge the Palestinian people's right to rule themselves, it finds itself completely isolated. There isn't a single country in the world that accepts this distorted Israeli projection of self-rule. When the Americans talked [to the Israelis] on this matter, the Israelis could not say a single word in its defense. The Israelis even tried to dodge the matter and told the Americans that what had been published was no more than one of several alternatives and that Sharon, with his blind fanaticism, was the one who announced those incomplete paragraphs of the report drawn up by the committee entrusted with studying the issue. I am not citing this to show Israel's goodwill but to show that it is aware of its weak argument and of its inability to confront anybody with this argument.

"On the other hand, the United States is aware that it is better for it to broaden its understanding of the Palestinian people's issue, that the entire Arab nation is unanimous in demanding this understanding of the United States, that this nation attaches extreme importance to this understanding in its dealing with the United States and that this nation uses this understanding as a measuring stick for judging U.S. policy in the area and the sincerity of Washington's intentions. On this basis, Egypt submitted to the United States a memorandum on the Arab concept of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza calling for the Palestinian government to enjoy full executive, legislative and judiciary powers and to control the land, water, taxes, general security, travel, movement and the various forms of economic activity. We will watch the U.S. position toward this vital issue in the coming months to see how it will put into practice the commitment President Carter undertook before the Egyptian People's Assembly to exert his utmost efforts so that the settlement will cover all aspects of the conflict."

Where do these statements stand vis-a-vis what has actually happened? Hasn't the plan of Sharon, "with his blind fanaticism," become the only plan currently projected and accepted by Israel?

Where is the U.S. position that al-Baz promised?

Al-Baz further said:

"The entire world knows, or must know, that if any Arab country is exposed to aggression by Israel or by others, Egypt will consider such an aggression an attack against it. We are not saying this out of the desire to launch slogans or out of intellectual luxury. We declare this being fully aware of all the dimensions and consequences of this declaration."

There is no need to answer this paragraph. The destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the barbaric Israeli raid against Beirut, the list of Israel's daily aggressions against southern Lebanon and Egypt's position toward all this are the only answer to this "view."

Why do I write about Usamah al-Baz?

Briefly, because Usamah al-Baz is the political mind behind Husni Mubarak. Consequently, this mind will participate in formulating Egypt's policy in Husni

Mubarak's era. Moreover, we would not be exaggerating if we said, on the basis of definite information at our disposal, that al-Baz will be the shadow president in the coming era.

We only ask Usamah al-Baz to be true to the article he wrote in AL-MUSTAQBAL more than 2 years ago and especially true to his words when he said:

"Briefly, we believe that the Arab nation is the only one capable of safeguarding the area's security and stability. Moreover, we reject the vacuum theories that have begun to emerge anew in the area in the wake of the Iranian revolution, which is undoubtedly one of the most serious developments experienced by the area. We believe that we, the Arabs, are capable of filling any vacuum in our area. Our capability will improve continually if we employ our material and spiritual resources well, especially since the signs indicate that all the countries adjacent to our area are constantly moving closer to us and are gradually ridding themselves of the residues that accumulated in the colonialist age to which we were all subjected in the second half of the last century and the first half of this century.

"It is ridiculous when some say that Egypt is seeking anew to lead the area to the age of alliances or that Egypt is performing the role of the West's policeman in the area. This is the last thing to occur to us. As Egypt confronted the Baghdad Pact and the desperate endeavors by the United States and the Western countries to turn the Arab area into a sphere of Western influence under the pretext of fighting the communist danger, we will confront any endeavor to bring back this influence under a new form and we will not accept any alliance that swerves from the circles to which we have committed ourselves, namely the Arab, African and Islamic circles and the nonalignment circle that, we believe, can play a bigger and more serious role in the coming period if they confront the challenges facing them courageously and seriously."

By the time this edition of AL-MUSTAQBAL is issued, Husni Mubarak will have become the fourth president of Egypt since the 1952 revolution. A lot has been said and will be said about Mubarak and a lot has been written and will be written about him, including such statements as: He is not responsible for al-Sadat's policy and he was merely an "executor" of that policy under the guardianship of al-Sadat.

Now that he has become the number one official, will he read what al-Baz, "his shadow," wrote on his instruction and under his supervision?

Right now, we ask Mubarak for no more than this. Let him start by abolishing the U.S. military facilities in Egypt.

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CSO: 4504/56

EXPANDED SYSTEM OF YOUTH CLUBS PROMOTED BY MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Oct 81 p 1

[Article by Marzuq Hilal and Majidah Ibrahim: "Al-Azhar Discusses Question of Correcting Faulty Concepts Among Youth"]

[Text] Today, Al-Azhar Higher Council and the Islamic Research Academy will discuss in an emergency meeting under the chairmanship of Grand Imam Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Bisar, the shaykh of al-Azhar, the method of work in the current phase, the reply to false beliefs, refutation of faulty concepts and the confrontation to eliminate religious doubts and to correct the Islamic concepts among the youth. It has been decided to form a committee to issue a scientific religious series to present the religious issues correctly. This publication will be financed by the Islamic Research Academy.

The Ministry of Social Affairs has decided to expand the creation of social youth clubs so that they may occupy the youth's free time and familiarize them with the correct concepts that enable them to perform a positive role in development and construction activities. It has also been decided to train the leaders who will manage these clubs as of the beginning of November so that this goal can be realized.

This is stated in the resolutions issued by a plenary meeting held yesterday by Dr Amal 'Uthman, minister of social affairs, with the directors of social affairs in the seven districts of Cairo, with the officials in charge of management of the clubs and with the undersecretaries in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The meeting was also attended by His Eminence Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, chairman of the Muslim Youth Associations.

At the meeting, the minister said: In view of the effectiveness of the private activity in this sphere, it has been decided to entrust the management of the social clubs to some private associations. There are 26 clubs in Cairo's districts and this number will be increased in the governorates.

Symbolic Subscriptions

The minister also said: These clubs will open their doors to various youth groups, be they comprised of students, workers or farmers, in return for symbolic



subscriptions and will carry out programs compatible with youth needs, including classes to improve the students [academically] up to the university level. This is in addition to technical training for whomever wishes to get it, recreational programs, national and religious lectures and summer trips and camps.

The minister stressed that the state (subsidizes) these clubs and will provide them with all the necessary material resources. As of the beginning of November, the ministry will conduct training courses for the leader who will manage these clubs so that the clubs can realize the desired goal of raising a good generation capable of realizing the people's aspirations for development and prosperity.

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CSO: 4504/56



## BRIEFS

POPULAR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS--Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, chairman of the Democratic National Party's Popular Development Committee, has stated that the popular development projects will experience a new upsurge in the coming phase so as to serve Egypt's prosperity in the light of President Husni Mubarak's instructions. 'Uthman has also said that the system of work will focus on compressing the time needed to build the production projects so that such projects can enter the production phase in the shortest time possible. The work plan will also focus on overcoming all the difficulties that face development. At his meeting with the party's popular development sector yesterday, 'Uthman said that emphasis will be placed on the "productive village project." This type of project calls for establishing central firms in Cairo with branches in the provinces to transform the village from a consuming to a productive entity. 'Uthman also said that 5,000 feddans of reclaimed land west of al-Nubariyah will be distributed to graduates [of agriculture schools] before the end of this year at the rate of 10 feddans per graduate. It has also been decided to use the system of collective farms and to employ modern irrigation systems to increase the production of vegetables, fruits and various kinds of cotton. [Text] [Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 19 Oct 81 p 8] 8494

DISCIPLINE IN TAX AGENCY--Report by Fu'ad Fawwaz--It has been decided to watch the arrival and departure of the Tax Agency workers so that they work from 0815 to 1615 to clear delayed files and backlog and to facilitate matters for the taxpayers. The General Directorate of Administrative Guidance is making daily inspections to monitor the presence of workers during work hours. This has been stated by an official of the Tax Agency who has said that these measures come as part of the steps to establish discipline and to prevent laxity. The official added that it has been decided to streamline spending in the bureaucratic departments. The agency will receive at the beginning of next January the new tax [agency] building, which has 208 rooms and can accommodate nearly 1,000 workers. The agency workers have also been trained to use the electronic computer, which will go into operation next January. [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Oct 81 p 6] 8494

INCREASE IN SAVINGS--An increase of 3.54 billion pounds has been realized in total savings as a result of increased interest rates for saving deposits in the preceding period. The savings accumulated by the banking system, represented in on-demand and set-term deposits, rose from 1,512,000,000 pounds in 1977 to

5,052,000,000 pounds at the end of June 1981. The deputy prime minister for economic and financial affairs has stated that the gross national product for 1980-81 amounts to 14.4 billion pounds compared to 13.2 billions in 1979-80, that is, an increase of 1.2 billion pounds or nearly 9.1 percent. The commodity sectors have contributed nearly 604 million pounds, the service and production sectors nearly 346 million pounds and the social and civil service sectors nearly 263 million pounds to this increase. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18 Oct 81 p 9] 8494

CSO: 4504/56

NOWBARI CALLS FOR 'DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM' AFTER KHOMEYNI

Vienna ARBEITER ZEITUNG in German No 259, 9 Nov 81 p 3

[Interview with Ali Reza Nowbari, former president of the Central Bank, by Editor Peter Palinka; time and place not given]

[Text] "The present regime in Iran gives open signs of fascist character in several respects." This was the way the most important associate of the exiled Iranian president Bani-Sadr, the former head of the Iranian National Bank, Ali Reza Nowbari, characterized political conditions in his homeland, which he left after having spent several weeks underground. Nowbari, who like Bani-Sadr, intends to live in exile in France, says of Iran's future, "Khomeyni has at most 15 percent of the population behind him; his rule will collapse for economic and political reasons within a relatively short time." Nowbari, in the conversation with AZ editor Peter Palinka in Frankfurt, was appealing for a broad unity of all opposition groups, with the exception of those who would not accept the justification of the revolution against the Shah, such as the former minister-president Bakhtiar. "The army, together with the masses, will create pluralism."

AZ: Mr. Nowbari, would you describe for us your previous political development in Iran?

Nowbari: Since the beginning of the 1970's, I had been working closely with Mr. Bani-Sadr. When the revolution against the Shah succeeded in 1979, I returned from the U.S.--among other things I had been studying at Stanford. Together with a number of friends, I started the newspaper ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; I was the publisher. We had no experience in journalism, we only felt ourselves bound by the ideas of freedom of the press and of opinion. On 15 November 1979, 1 day after Mr. Carter froze our assets, I was appointed president of the Central Bank of Iran. I held this position for 19 months, probably one of the longest tenures of office in the history of the Islamic Republic. On the same day that command of the army was taken away from Mr. Bani-Sadr, I went underground. For 17 days, the revolutionary guards surrounded the Central Bank; but my own guards succeeded in holding them off for those 17 days.

AZ: How do you see the present political situation in Iran?

Nowbari: I think it a shame that the great hopes and expectations for our republic have been so let down. We began as a progressive movement in the Middle

East and in the world and now we have a regime, which in several respects shows openly fascist traits. We still believe today that our revolution was inspired by the humanitarian traditions of Islam and the whole world and we wanted to show this world the spirituality that was missing in the 20th century. We wanted to provide new answers for the problems of mankind, especially of young people. These hopes have been shattered, our people now feel only bitterness, impotence, or hate.

AZ: Bani-Sadr as well as yourself are still religious elements of the movement just as are the present rulers. What led to this split in the religious movement?

Nowbari: There is a proverb, "Even the devil can have his version of God." It is true that we were all under the banner of Khomeyni before the revolution: Bani-Sadr, Beheshti, most of the intellectuals, many Marxists. That does not mean that we had no differences of opinion, which then surfaced after the revolution against the Shah. We suppressed these differences because our striving for freedom and independence was even greater and more important. All that changed, as did the feeling among the people: in the beginning, when we held the referendum for the Islamic Republic, Khomeyni had more than 90 percent of the people behind him; now it would probably be around 15 percent.

AZ: Then why is he still in power?

Nowbari: There are many dictators who no longer have any support and who still remain in power: the way in which they came to power varies: Khomeyni had almost the entire people behind him; Hitler had fewer though still a mass movement; the Shah never had more than 10 percent. Khomeyni maintains himself like the dictators today in Chile or Argentina: there are massive arrests and executions. You demonstrate and you are arrested; you watch a demonstration and you are arrested; mothers are praised when they denounce their children and vice-versa. There are slogans that urge denouncing anyone who thinks against the regime. This I call fascism.

AZ: How much longer will this system survive?

Nowbari: I don't think for much longer. I don't want to name a date that won't come to pass. But Khomeyni is increasingly losing everything: the intellectuals are already lost, opposition is growing among the clergy--six out of eight of the great ayatollahs are already against him--in the army he has practically no following.

AZ: Then why doesn't the army intervene?

Nowbari: Because it is not in Teheran but tied up in the war with Iraq. This is an absolutely stupid war between two naked men who are fighting for a scrap of clothing. The war continues to go on because it is to the advantage of two dictators, Saddam Hussein and Khomeyni.

AZ: What prospects do you see for the opposition?

Nowbari: It has to be known that we have no tradition of organized groups or parties in Iran. Khomeyni was victorious because he had access to the masses; and that is how we must do it also. We, that is the strongest group, the Mojaheddin or National Front. Our vision is the creation of a democratic pluralism and economic planning that will make investments possible. At the moment nothing is happening economically, private parties are hoarding and not investing, and the state administration is incapable of planning.

AZ: Does this include alliance with supporters of the Shah?

Nowbari: Absolutely not. The royalists, because of their crimes, have no following, not even in the army. There are many jokes today comparing the Shah with Khomeyni, there are also people who say that Khomeyni is worse than the Shah, but no one yearns for the return of the monarchy. We also exclude--in contrast to General Madani--the last minister-president under the Shah, Bakhtiar, from this alliance, who is working against us now in Paris. Anyhow, we must succeed in winning soon and in restoring democratic pluralism. Otherwise, the disappointed masses will turn to a new strong man.

9878

CSO: 4620/8

# TEENAGERS COMMEMORATE 'BASSIJ' FOUNDING

NC300938 Paris AFP in English 0919 GMT 30 Nov 81

[text] Tehran, 30 Nov (AFP)--There are noisy week-long celebrations throughout the country to commemorate the second anniversary of the founding of the "Bassij"--literally "mobilisation of the disinherited"--composed of teenagers watching for "plots by Americans and hypocrites."

The average age is between 16-18, but some of them are not even 14 years old. Over the past few days they have been parading in their thousands in the capital and other Iranian towns. Most do not wear uniforms, but some of the older ones wear the green camouflage combat kit of the "Pasdarans" revolutionary guards.

Many marching down the Enghelab (Revolution) Avenue proudly shoulder rifles with flowers in the barrels while others handled their weapons awkwardly.

The "Bassij" guard mosques and go on patrols at night, ready to warn their "brothers" if they see any suspicious activities. If one of them gives really fine service, he is rewarded by being allowed to go to one of the war fronts against Iraq, and when he is older to join the Padarans or the revolutionary committees.

The Bassij is profoundly nationalistic and militaristic, with martyrdom a proclaimed ideal. Members look on internal and external enemies as all being linked in the same anti-Tehran plot.

Ali Akhbar, a worker, told the daily newspaper KEYHAN: "I demand that our leaders allow us to exterminate the hypocrites to their very roots."

Another "Bassij," Akbar Mohammadi, told KEYHAN: "I will fight to the bitter end until the banner 'There is no God but allah' flies over the entire world."

Iranian newspapers fulsomely praise the Bassij with such phrases as "these young men use their chaste bodies as shields against bullets from East or West."

Iranian leaders like Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of Parliament are enthusiastic over the teenagers who "day and night defend the poor people, without expecting payment or glory."



Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek, the head of the Bassij, recently recalled how the movement was founded on 26 November 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni when he "mobilised an army of 20 million" against the "huge CIA (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) fleet steaming towards the Gulf."

The authorities have published details about the "Bassij" showing that two million teenagers have been given some kind of military training: there are "bases" in 3,000 mosques, including 500 in Tehran; 21,000 members have been sent to the warfront.

Members are recruited in schools and factories and they are given political training. Even young women are taught how to fire guns.

CSO: 4600/139

## COMMENTARY REPLIES TO KHAMENE'I'S ACCUSATIONS

NC261400 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 25 Nov 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] Compatriots! Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, president of Khomeyni's so-called republic, thinks that he has replied to the Free Voice of Iran. He has said that this radio speaks of the situation in Iran as if only a few more days are left before the downfall of the Islamic Republic and that by badly describing the situation it intends to deprive the people of their hopes for the future, to do away with the people's trust in the government in a bid to leave the government to itself. He then added that "naturally without the help of the nation, the government cannot do anything important but our domestic situation--despite the existence of hundreds of difficulties--is not as bad as they say. We do have many difficulties and it is a sin to tell the people that we do not have any difficulties. But having difficulties does not mean that there is no cure for the illness. Difficulty is like an illness. A wise and proficient doctor can heal this illness and this needs patience and time. We have difficulties--in the economy, security and the war as well as the fact that production units have stopped working, refineries are idle and so on and so forth. But we will overcome these difficulties as we overcame the difficulty of the monarchy and of U.S. domination. If the nation does not lose faith in God and the "leadership," all these difficulties can be overcome. But if the government and nation do not act in unison, then these difficulties will not be solved and smaller difficulties than these will not be solved either."

Compatriots! With these contradictory remarks and with all these "ifs" and "buts," although Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i did not confirm our judgement on the fate of Khomeyni's regime, he did not refute it. He cannot tell millions of unemployed people that "we have created jobs for everyone." He is compelled to place this alongside the hundreds of difficulties that the regime is facing. Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i cannot tell the people, who can see for themselves how much the country's industrial and agricultural production has fallen, that "no disorder can be seen in our agricultural and industrial affairs." In this case too he is compelled to list this among the difficulties. Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i cannot tell the war refugees that "nothing has happened and no incident has been the cause for you to leave your home and livelihood," he very simply places the lack of order and welfare of more than 1.5 million people among the hundreds of difficulties. He cannot tell the residents of cities, villages and tribes that there

is no sign of disturbance and that complete security rules everywhere. What he can say is that "the lack of security is also among the problems that we are thinking of uprooting." Just as the budget--the larger part of which is a deficit and without sources to compensate for this deficit--the oil production for which no step has been taken to increase it and which has not surpassed producing the 1-million-barrel per day for more than 2 years now and, finally, institutions and organizations of which all the wheels are stuck in the mud and unable to make a step forward, for the regime's president, all these are difficulties of the same kind for which remedies from a proficient doctor should be found. But the essence of the matter is that by mentioning the proficient doctor or doctors perfunctorily and by using ambiguous words, Khamene'i thinks that he can convince the people, but they know that the regime's Achilles' heel is the lack of men--efficient men.

Actually, the cause of the regime's problems is that it had men for destroying, but no one for construction. It is because of this lack of men that Khomeyni's anti-national regime has so far been unable to do a damn thing and will be unable to move or solve any problems in the future.

Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i has not denied any of the difficulties about which we have spoken on the Free Voice of Iran so far. He accepts all that we say. He also confirms the existence of the same difficulties, and, if there are differences in the assessments made by the Free Voice of Iran with the assessments made by Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, it is in that by using a few "ifs" and "buts" he claims that the destructive regime will solve these difficulties, and we say that if ifs and ands were pots and pans there would be no use for tinkers.

Yes, if there were proficient doctors; if the nation shows coordination with Khomeyni's Islamic Republic; if the atmosphere is created for jobs and Iran's reconstruction; if the political and social situations in the area help; if the country's purse is not empty and the government is given sufficient money, all these problems can be solved. But all these ifs in themselves constitute a big problem.

When Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i speaks of having solved the problem of monarchy and U.S. domination, he either knows and does not consider it convenient to say that he knows, or he does not know and does not understand that what was done was destruction, not construction. And even in this destruction all that which Khomeyni has done have been illusive. All that which was done was illusive and not deep and profound. As the great danger hovering above Khomeyni's Islamic Republic is the same danger that one day hit the great French revolution and brought out a Napoleon Bonaparte from the heart of the revolution and placed on the emperor's throne and shattered the dreams and illusions of all those who, for more than 5 years, had done nothing but destroying and killing. Of course there are thousands of differences between the sedition brought by Khomeyni and the great French revolution, but there is one common point between these two--massacres and destruction.

The fact that we say that Khomeyni's self-made regime has reached an impasse and can neither go forward nor backward and its only fate is downfall it is because we know that the regime has many mullahs, many narrators, many murderers, it has many Khamene'is, Rafsanjanis and Khalkhalis. But it does not have a

doctor, or better said, doctors proficient in politics. And with the tools the functions of which were destruction a country cannot be constructed and, as Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i said, hundreds of problems be solved. If for almost 3 years any one of the regime's officials could have performed this miracle he would have done so so far and not say--and that after 3 years--that "people be hopeful because we will solve these difficulties in the future."

Khomeyni's self-made republic is doomed to fall and if, for example, it keeps the Iranian nation busy for a few more days with a bunch of empty words, sooner or later it will not be able to escape its definite fate and with (?wishful thinking) the mullahs cannot keep this paper image propped up, oh compatriots!

CSO: 4640/71

CLANDESTINE ON 'IRANIAN NATIONALISTS' STRUGGLES

NC021712 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 2 Dec 81

[Text] Our compatriots' national struggles aimed at overthrowing Khomeyni's antinational regime continue on a vast scale. Despite the regime's efforts to attract the public opinion in Iran to the war and to condemn national struggles among commotions of the war, patriots believing in Iran's unity, independence, history and freedom continue to destroy the regime's internal bases and kill elements of the mullahs' dictatorship. We inform our dear compatriots and listeners of the Free Voice of Iran of a number of short reports as an example of part of these national struggles.

Antiregime patriots killed eight of the regime's Revolution Guards in Isfahan and blew up a car belonging to the guards. A Free Voice of Iran correspondent reports that opponents of the regime killed the guards while they were being followed by the guards. In this incident in Isfahan 12 Revolution Guards were wounded. They are now in the hospital, and three of them are in very critical condition. The three wounded Revolution Guards have undergone a number of operations so far, but the doctors treating them express dissatisfaction on the effect of the operations and treatment. Our correspondent reports that one of the Revolution Guards who died on his way to the hospital, Morteza Tajik, led the group in charge of the killing of the regime's opponents in Isfahan. Following the killing of this group [presumably the Revolution Guards], the regime issued orders on the execution of 20 political prisoners in Isfahan.

Another report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent indicates that in an attack by a group of Revolution Guards against a communal house of patriotic forces opposing the regime on Saba Avenue, East Tehran, two of the Revolution Guards were killed and three of them were wounded.

CSO: 4640/72

IRAN

RADIO SCORES MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ

NC021650 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 1 Dec 81

[Unattributed talk]

[Text] Dear compatriots! In our talk today we will study the confessions made by two of the leaders of the Islamic Republic. One of these two is the master of the other in hypocrisy and deceit. His name is renowned all over the world and is Khomeyni. The second person, even though a student of the first, sets one step further than his master in hypocrisy. His name is Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

Recently, Khomeyni has been making some confessions that will undoubtedly form a major part of the regrettable history of the adverse republic--confessions that apparently lighten the burden of his endless crimes and which grant him some calm in these last days of his bloody and treacherous life.

Among Khomeyni's confessions were those concerning the dark incidents of the winter of about 3 years ago, in February 1978, when treacherous and plundering groups--groups whose mission was to destroy--in addition to setting fire to the wealth of the nation, attacked the garrisons and plundered the big and small arms of the Iranian Army. These are the same groups which fired at any conscientious officer or civilian, did all that should not have been done, the most important part of treacherous missions and those acts which led to the disintegration of the armed forces and the country's security organs, placed the destiny of Iran and of the Iranians in the hands of a bunch of hooligans and, by weakening one of the world's strongest armies, brought in the foreign aggressors who exploited the weakness of the country's leadership and aggressed against our country in a bid to confront idiotic plans.

Khomeyni's last confession bothers the conscience of all the Iranians and pours oil on the fire of rage and hatred. After almost 3 years of secrecy, Khomeyni finally confesses that at the very beginning of this cursed and wretched revolution, in February 1978, the Mojahedin-e Khalq plundered the military garrisons and, in addition to confiscating the arms of the armed forces--the belongings of the Iranian nation--they started arresting and assassinating the military personnel.

Even though something has been omitted in Khomeyni's confessions and no reference has been made to the plunderings and pillagings by the then revolutionary hooligans and the present bullying hezbollahis, nevertheless one point is worthy of



reflection more than the other points. Why and how did Mr Khomeyni wait for 3 whole years and keep this secret from the Iranian nation and unveiled all this when he rose in a war with the Mojahedin? Of course, there is no doubt in the fact that many alert people were aware of how a small organization like the Mojahedin-e Khalq suddenly came to own a great quantity of various types of modern arms and formed a terrorist army and set up a training camp. But the main point is: Why did Khomeyni and other leaders, even though they were aware of this treason, stay silent and are today using this as a weapon against their rival the Mojahedin organization? Had the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, as during the disturbances of the summer, fall and winter of 1978, remained connected to Khomeyni and shared in ruling as the rest of Khomeyni's pets, would Khomeyni have confessed what he did and unveiled the truth? There is no doubt that he wouldn't have done so, in the same way that he knows many other bitter truths and about satanic plans and Iran-destroying plots of 3 years ago and does not speak. Khomeyni makes no mention of his relations and about the relations between his bearded and beardless associates with foreigners and envoys of colonialist powers. However, there is no doubt that history knows all the details of this treason by heart and the Iranian nation will come to know of these sooner or later.

In today's talk we will discuss another confession made by a fox-faced mullah like Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In his meeting with members of the Central Committee of the so-called reconstruction crusade, Mullah Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that the reopening of the universities will create great difficulties for the regime. Therefore, the members of this antipeople institution should prepare themselves to confront any problem in relation with this.

Mullah Rafsanjani, whose impudence has surpassed the limits of shamelessness, calls an antipeople and repressive institution like the destruction crusade the dearest institution of the Islamic Republic and says that they should be supported as much as possible.

Actually, like the other mullahs of the regime who always express flagrant support for the knife-wielders and plundering hezbollahis, Hashemi-Rafsanjani advises members of the destruction crusade to prepare themselves to continue rendering their services to the bloodthirsty imam and his criminal mullahs if the universities are reopened. In these remarks by Hashemi-Rafsanjani there lies another confession and that is that if the universities are reopened the regime will truly face a great problem. This is of course true because this time Iran's zealous and alert youths will turn the university into impenetrable position. This time the university will be the manifester of the loftiest feelings of Iran's youths and this time Iran's youths will not be deceived by any of the claimants of the so-called Islamic regime. By uprooting this cursed regime they will put a more cursed regime like the Democratic Islamic Republic in the hands of its harbingers and, like today, the holy anthem of "Long live Iran" will ring throughout our homeland.

CSO: 4640/71

CLANDESTINE CALLS FOR REFUGE TO REPENTING GUARDS

NC281835 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 28 Nov 81

[Text] Armed combatants in our country who have resumed the killing of the fascist mullahs at the request of the Iranian nation, continue their attempts to assassinate mullahs and the regime's officials. Reports from a reliable source in Tehran state that a group of fugitive Revolution Guards have joined antiregime groups, bringing with them their arms and ammunition. Latest reports indicate that several fugitive Revolution Guards had assisted armed combatants in the revolutionary execution of Mullah Shari'ati-Fard and his two bodyguards.

An informed source told a Free Voice of Iran correspondent in Tehran that the existing differences within the Revolution Guards Corps stem from the fact that after having gained full acquaintance with the mullahs and with the antinational ideals of the so-called Islamic regime, many of the Revolution Guards are no longer prepared to serve such a regime and to be the means used in killing their compatriots. In many cases too, some Revolution Guards have shown brave resistance against the mullahs, and this is the reason why these Revolution Guards have been sentenced to imprisonment by the mullahs.

Ending this report, we, in the name of the Free Voice of Iran, ask our compatriots to grant refuge to fugitive Revolution Guards if their request is trusted and to welcome Revolution Guards who join the people. The Free Voice of Iran also advises those Revolution Guards who were previously deceived by Khomeyni's disgraceful regime and who now regret this to leave their jobs and to fearlessly join the ranks of the armed combatants in any antiregime group, especially opposition groups with nationalist feelings and belief in Iran's history and traditions. The arms of national groups that believe in the history and oneness of the Aryan race are open to these brothers who want to compensate their past sins against the Iranian nation.

CSO: 4640/72

REGIME REPORTED USING FAHD PLAN TO DECEIVE PEOPLE

GF261745 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 26 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots, as you have heard and read, the propaganda machine of Khomeyni's regime these days is using the Saudi Arabian proposal for solving the Arab-Israeli dispute as an excuse for another propaganda campaign. This is being done in order to divert people's thoughts from fundamental problems for a few more days. This is why last week another street show was arranged as a so-called battle against imperialism. This is not the first time that the play of death [of] the United States has been produced by the authorities of the reign of terror in Tehran and other cities.

However, if there were some who believed if during the first months of the mullahs' rule that participating in such plays was truly a battle against imperialism--when the secret collusion of the Tehran regime with all imperialists was revealed and when it became clear to anyone with the slightest amount of intelligence that such man-made plays are only enacted when the mullahs have reached the bottom of the pot--hardly anyone has shown the desire to participate in one. For ordinary people in the streets, who are not used to political analysis, who have to stand in line for a few liters of heating oil, put up with meat and sugar rationing--forced on them by the government that allegedly is a defender of the oppressed--and put up with shortages of essential goods, the question arises: Why should they listen to the meaningless words of the ruling mullahs and worry about other nations?

The mullahs are sitting in warm cozy houses and in the manner of masters and feudalists have their meat, oil, rice, chicken and heating oil delivered every week to their houses by their servants and gunslingers. For the ordinary people, who for a time followed the mullahs of the Islamic Republic purely out of their religious beliefs and who had considered this deceptive lot their religious leaders, the simple question is posed: Why is it that the mullahs and prayer leaders have shouted about the defense of the oppressed nations and cry for the oppressed people yet have not taken one step to help the oppressed classes--on the basis of their own confession--in the past 3 years of their rule? They have actually strengthened their bonds of slavery, clamped their mouths and put a spy or professional killer in charge of each and every one of them so that if they make

one gesture of dissent in their bread of heating oil lines they will either be executed on the spot as enemies of the deputy of Mahdi or as infidels or as wagers of war against God or taken to one of the countless dungeons.

Regardless of all the slogans, chants and plays set up in Jamaran, at the former Tehran University and on Tehran streets, the ordinary people only ask each other where in the world is life like this? There were no such things during the monarchy. The Islam that Khomeyni has brought has nothing in common with our Islam and that of our forefathers. The same people sigh and tell each other: It is what we deserve. We revolted for just such a thing.

We, however, say no. You innocent people, you oppressed masses of the Iranian people, this is not what you deserve. You are experiencing very bitter but important times. What you have suffered in these past 3 years is all a great lesson to you and your children not to be deceived by promises of others. Until you have learned about someone you should not become his follower. Do not allow the mullahs to give you empty slogans in the place of bread and water. Do not allow them to destroy your country in the guise of a battle against imperialism. [Do not allow them to] destroy the country's economy, its talent and its natural resources in such a manner that will enable the same imperialists who are waiting like vultures to devour the nearly dead body of your homeland.

If you do not want to witness the complete destruction of the motherland and further misery for yourselves and your children, you must move. You must topple the deceitful and criminal regime of Khomeyni. Iranians, you who reside by the Persian Gulf, you brave Kurdish and Azarbayjani fighters, you Baluchi, Turkmen, Khuzestani and Khorasani warriors, you Persians, Mazandarani and Gilanis, you have nothing to lose in this battle to free (?yourselves) from the claws of these satans ruling Iran--these road rollers of imperialism and colonialism--but the bonds of slavery.

CSO: 4640/72

## OVERVIEW OF AZERBAIJANI ENGINEERING PROJECTS GIVEN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] By implementing the plan to utilize river water along the Iran-Turkey border putting into operation the Khoda-Afarin Dam, 105,000 hectares of barren land will be cultivated and 140 megawatts of electrical power will be produced by the dam.

During a press conference, Engineer Milani, managing director of the Azerbaijan Regional Water Organization, while making this announcement, elaborated on the post-revolution activities of this organization: "The Azerbaijan Regional Water Organization since the revolution in order to attain technical self-sufficiency and free itself from foreign and domestic consulting engineers, by attracting pious, committed and expert forces, has been able to undertake 12 major and 200 minor projects like dam construction, water distribution and sewage, drainage, digging of deep and semi-deep wells and canals, irrigation, dredging and canalization; river flood control as well as the repair of these facilities. And a number of these projects have gone into operation."

During the press conference, the managing director of the Azerbaijan Regional Water Organization disclosed the following concerning the most important projects undertaken by the organization:

"The project to utilize the river water along the Iran-Turkey border through which 65,000 hectares of regional land will be brought under cultivation in five fields. The construction project for the Khoda-Afarin Dam in Moghan is also one of the country's important and major projects. This dam is to be built across the Arax River along the Iran-Soviet border through cooperation between the two countries. Upon completion of this project, 40,000 hectares of secondary terrace land in the region will be brought under cultivation and the dam will produce 140 megawatts of electric power."

He added: "The survey work for the project has been completed and its actual implementation will soon begin. More than 2,000 of the country's unemployed will be hired for this work."

"Among the Azerbaijan Regional Water Organization's other projects are the Shut hydroelectric plant in Moghan; the construction of the Qanbar Dam in Azarshahr; the multi-purpose project for the Sufichay River in Maragheh; dam construction in Urumiyeh and Salmas; land drainage in Moghan; and an irrigation project for 79 cities and villages; a sewage project for Tabriz; and providing water to the 800-megwatt thermal power station in Tabriz."

He went on to say: Furthermore, during the period since the revolution, the Azerbaijan Regional Water Organization has succeeded in digging and putting into operation 131,565 deep and semi-deep wells plus 1,887 canals in the region. Among the organization's other activities during this period, 6,150 branch-lines have been put in and 325 kilometers of dredging, canals and drainage completed in the border areas of Moghan; irrigation has been provided to 60,000 hectares of arable land; the completion and operation of pumping stations in districts 3 and 7 that generate 102 million watt-hours of power from the Arax Dam; and the first steps in the construction of factories to manufacture sewer and chlorine piping."

CSO: 4640/74



## BRIEFS

**MERCHANTS, BAZAARIS ARRESTED**--Our correspondent has reported that several prominent merchants and Tehran bazaaris have been arrested on charges of not being ready to invest. Some days ago Khomeyni's prime minister, Musavi-Khamene'i, had requested that the Iranian merchants resume their commercial and trade activities, assuring them that the Islamic regime's clergymen will no longer confiscate their capital and wealth. It was said in Tehran's commercial circles that the regime intends to confiscate the wealth of the arrested merchants on grounds of paralyzing the country's economy. [Text] [NC251638 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 25 Nov 81]

**TUDEH PARTY, GUARD CORPS**--Sheykh Mahallati, Ruhollah Khomeyni's representative in the Revolution Guards Corps, has told the PARS News Agency that opponents of the regime have infiltrated into the Revolution Guards Corps. He said that these people are members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization who want to incite the Revolution Guards against the regime. Some days ago Musavi-Tabrizi had said that agents of the Tudeh Party had infiltrated into the Revolution Guards Corps and other Islamic organs. Political observers in Tehran state that the changing of the Tudeh Party members to the Mojahedin by Sheykh Mahallati came after threats by the Tudeh Party. According to these observers, the Tudeh Party has told Ruhollah Khomeyni that iff such reports are published on the Tudeh Party members, the party will stop assisting the Islamic Republic. [Text] [NC261545 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 26 Nov 81]

**ANTIREGIME UNION**--Our correspondent in Tehran has reported that a newly formed Civil Servants Union has issued a statement calling on all Iranian patriots to unite and prepare to remove the clerical regime. In this statement, the organizers of the Civil Servants Union have not been named. In its statement, the newly formed Civil Servants Union warns various groups to regain their homeland's territory and national identity first and then carry out ideological struggles. Several other groups and organizations have also issued statements calling on opponents of the regime to unite their ranks to overthrow the clerical regime. [Text] [NC261724 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 26 Nov 81]

**MUSAVI'S VISIT TO BALUCHESTAN**--According to the Voice of Iran correspondent, clashes between Baluch combatants and Khomeyni's guards continue in Sistan Baluchestan Province. Following the increased unrest in this part of our country, Hoseyn Musavi-Khamene'i, the prime minister of the mullahs' regime, accompanied

by Banki, the regime's minister of state in charge of plan and budget organizations, unexpectedly arrived in Zahedan on Friday to deliver speeches in order to reduce the opposition of the Baluch people against the ruling regime and encourage their agents to continue their cooperation with the regime. Our correspondent adds: During the past week, sporadic clashes have taken place between the courageous combatants of the Baluch Unity Organization and Khomeyni's guards in various parts of Baluchestan. As a result a large number of Khomeyni's mercenaries were killed. According to the latest reports from Baluchestan, the freedom fighters' struggle against the treacherous antinationalists continues. Baluch combatants are recording new victories against Khomeyni's guards every day. [Text] [GF291010 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 29 Nov 81]

OPPOSITION COALESCING--A report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent indicates that the topic of forming a united force of opponents of the regime abroad was once again (?brought up) during the past week and noteworthy steps were taken to this effect. Information gained by the Free Voice of Iran correspondent states that Dr 'Ali Amini, in the role of coordinator toward this end, scored successes and, during various meetings, was able to create a rapprochement in the views of some of the opponents. It is said that efforts toward a coalition between members (?disagreeing) on national resistance against Khomeyni may reach results. This coalition is to take form as a council and not as a government-in-exile. Our correspondent has also reported that after his talks with leaders of fronts opposing the Tehran regime and toward national unity, Dr 'Ali Amini has apparently left Paris for a rest. Observers acquainted with matters pertaining to the national opposition abroad consider this trip of rest to be part of Dr 'Ali Amini's efforts toward a coalition of opponents of Khomeyni's regime, especially since this trip will be to the United States of America. [Text] [NC021701 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 2 Dec 81]

NOWBARI'S ANTIREGIME ACTIVITIES--Our correspondent has reported that former governor of the Central Bank of Iran, 'Alireza Nowbari, has started extensive activities in opposition to the clerical regime. He has contacted economic organizations and individuals in Europe who probably have economic relations with Khomeyni's regime and has submitted information and statistics to them that show the financial bankruptcy of the clerical regime. By doing so 'Alireza Nowbari wants to prevent the regime's trade associates abroad from continuing this cooperation with the clerical regime. [Text] [NC021715 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 2 Dec 81]

AMBASSADOR TO SAHARA APPOINTED--Algiers, 1 Dec (PARS News Agency)--The credentials of Mohammad Mehdi Karani, appointed as Iran's ambassador to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic have been accepted by the Sahrawi Foreign Ministry. The Sahrawi Ministry added that the expansion in relations between these two countries would further stabilize the anti-imperialist campaign. Mohammad Mehdi Karani is also the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Algiers. [Text] [LD020156 Tehran PARS in English 1754 GMT 1 Dec 81]

CSO: 4600/139

## FIXED LINK ACROSS GIBRALTAR STRAIT DISCUSSED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 12 Oct 81 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Mohamed Kabbaj, head of the mission to the Royal [Spanish Government and chief of the project to build a fixed link across the Straits of Gibraltar, by Nassiri Mustafa, date and place not given]

[Text] Yesterday, an idea which has long been an intriguing fantasy became a reality: A reality in the form of the royal meeting between his majesty King Hassan II and his majesty King Juan Carlos, who immediately decided to begin working toward the realization of that grandiose project, the fixed link between Europe and Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar.

It will be recalled that the first steps toward actualization of the project were the establishment of the Joint Hispano-Moroccan Commission, from which emerged two research firms, the Moroccan one being the National Straits Research Company (SNED).

It will also be recalled that his majesty the King, who attaches special importance to this project, named Mr Mohamed Kabbaj to personally watch over the implementation of the project.

In the following interview which he gave to L'OPINION, Mr Kabbaj discusses the unfolding of the various phases of the project and emphasizes the many benefits our country cannot fail to realize from the fixed link, once it is built.

[Question] Doubtless the proposed fixed link across the Straits of Gibraltar will mean a revolution in technology and communications. Would you tell us, Mr Kabbaj, how the idea was born?

[Answer] The history of this project deserves full explanation. I will confine myself to saying that the idea was born in the minds of great engineers who dreamed of great projects. After the opening of the Suez and then Panama Canals, many engineers gave thought to proposals to build a link across La Mancha and Gibraltar.

Ideas along this line go back to the end of the 19th Century, around 1860. From that time on, the idea haunted the minds of the great engineers, especially Spanish engineers during the occupation of northern Morocco.

After the Rifa war, the idea had a great deal of appeal, for strategic and economic reasons.

Other countries were also interested, especially France during the years of the occupation of Algeria. After the discovery of natural gas in Algeria, France thought about transporting the gas by means of a system of pipelines across the Straits of Gibraltar. So several projects relating to the Straits and a Spain-Morocco link were born.

But the idea did not really come to life until after the royal meeting between his majesty King Hassan II and his majesty King Juan Carlos in June 1978. That meeting really got the project started, since the two heads of state decided that Spain and Morocco would cooperate to build this great construction.

This is the basic history and the broad lines of the idea of a link across the Straits of Gibraltar.

[Question] From time to time, we hear talk of missions or projects related to research--already begun--preparing for the construction of the link. Can you tell us about them?

[Answer] We began by defining the first task completed after the royal decision: We proceeded to establish a joint commission set up following the signing of an agreement between the Moroccan and Spanish Governments. This joint commission itself created two research companies--including the National Straits Research Company (SNED).

His majesty the King named his royal highness Prince Moulay Hassan Bel Mehdi to head that company.

The first task of the joint commission was to establish a rational series of studies concerning the scope of the project, the advanced technology in every domain that would be needed. To this end, the commission contacted many experts.

Three main phases were established for the unfolding of the program.

- (1) Preliminary Phase.
- (2) Pre-feasibility Phase.
- (3) Feasibility Phase.

The preliminary phase, which has begun, itself includes two sub-phases: That of general studies or diagnosis, which has been under way since the beginning of the year and which will conclude within the next few months.

This is a very important stage, in which several Moroccan and foreign experts are taking part in the research. It is going to pull together what is known about the straits as well as the main conclusions that can be drawn from that data. The studies will cover such areas as:

- Physical data: Geology, oceanography, etc.
- Different types of feasible constructions and their design.
- A monograph on the economics.
- Legal aspects.



With these studies, we will have taken an important step and be moving forward to the next stage in accomplishment of our task.

For the preparation of this assessment, we have carried out a number of exploratory operations and physical surveys, organized technical symposia to get the advice of internationally known experts. We are going to begin a second phase, which is the stage of the preliminary study per se, which will begin upon completion of the diagnostic study (early 1982-summer 1982).

That study is going to complete the preliminary phase, which should have two primary results:

- A decision on the general concept of the link (construction).
- The approximate cost of the type of link chosen and its economic and general utility.

Then we will embark on what are called detailed studies.

[Question] This is an enormous project, which must overcome both technological and legal problems, among others. Can you tell us about the most serious ones?

[Answer] The problems in every branch of this project are many and complex. In every domain it touches, this project is a world "first." For example, in terms of the very great depth of the waters in the Straits, the concept of building something in those depths, the whole thing is new and unique.

Similarly, given the physical conditions in the Straits, which are unusual and peculiar, we find ourselves facing problems that can only be resolved in exceptional and original ways.

With respect to legal questions, the problem is rather complex, since it involves the latest contemporary ideas on law of the sea, on which numerous international conferences have been held. These terribly complex questions continue to be the subject of debates.

In that domain, several Moroccan and Spanish experts are working together to find appropriate solutions to these problems.

[Question] Fairly sizable projects have been built here and there around the world. They connect land separated by fairly large stretches of the sea. Would any of them be comparable with the Hispano-Moroccan fixed link?

[Answer] In fact, there is the example of the tunnel in Japan, the Seikar tunnel. It is a very big project, in terms of the size--54 km long--and connects two of Japan's islands. While that project is an interesting and original example, we do not think one could say it is exactly the same as what we propose to build.

For our part, we must confine ourselves to the conditions of land and sea, which are in fact different.

[Question] Several approaches to the building of this project have been advanced. The final decision on the type of construction cannot be made until after the studies have been completed. Would you tell us, Mr Kabbaj, about the different solutions being promoted?

[Answer] The solutions are very diverse. Some are on the surface: Bridges. Several versions of this kind of project might be envisaged. Or subterranean. For the moment, we are not dismissing any possibility, for we do not want to make a precipitous decision. Our decision should be based on objective and rational factors.

The point of the preliminary studies is just precisely to compare the various solutions in terms of their advantages and disadvantages technically, economically, legally, and with regard to their effect on the environment, and also in terms of their political and strategic significance and security and effects on security.

All these factors will be taken into consideration in the final decision.

[Question] Have other countries shown their interest in the project, for example by taking part in the studies that are under way?

[Answer] Several countries have shown interest in the studies for this project. Some of them are already participating. Others will later on. I think that, given the importance of the project and the sophisticated technology that will be required, we will have to bring in specialists in the most unusual disciplines, in which there are only a few real experts in the entire world, in order to get a grasp on the essential factors we are studying.

Such a project, which will connect two continents, must be considered in relation to the levels of communication possible for the countries of the two continents.

All the countries we have contacted--as well as the international organizations--have expressed great interest in the project. We have seen this in the Arab world, where several resolutions in support of it have been adopted. Several European organizations, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the EEC, the conference of European transportation ministers, the international railroad union, and other organizations have expressed their interest and given their support to the project. The same level of interest has been aroused in Africa.

[Question] Can you tell us, Mr Kabbaj, about the road and rail implications of the project?

[Answer] The Straits are the junction point between two important and complementary continents. The link across the Straits can only really be useful if it is supplemented by a new concept of trade between the North and South, and thus a new concept of the systems that will carry that trade. In that connection, the project study will contain proposals relating to all the systems which will arrive or end at the link itself, whether they are roads, railroads, or pipelines. Already, we have a number of ideas as to the design of these systems, which have been presented before international bodies. The project has given both Africa and Europe--and Africa in particular--a new vision of the networks connecting them. Europe was neglecting its southwestern region (Spain in particular) and very few European trunk lines terminate there, though now Europe realizes that these lines should extend beyond Spain and the Strait of Gibraltar. Just as Africa realizes that trade from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa have to cross our country to reach Europe via the Straits of Gibraltar.



[Question] Morocco and Spain are both cognizant of the benefits that cannot fail to be realized from this new communications link once it is complete. Prospects are very promising, it is said...

[Answer] The project is a grandiose one in its own right, construction of which will create thousands of jobs both in northern Morocco and southern Spain, and it will also have major impact on the various other sectors of the economy, in particular on tourism, which will certainly have enormous growth. In terms of industry and agriculture, the project will have positive impact in the sense that our country's products will be competitive on European markets, just as our country will be able to import products at lower cost. Morocco and Spain will thus become the nexus of communications between Europe and Africa and will certainly benefit from that position.

[Question] Some rough estimates as to the cost of the project have been made, but it is obvious that the cost can only be determined with any precision after the studies are completed. Could we have the order of magnitude?

[Answer] It is at present very difficult to cite numbers. However, I will give you some approximate costs for projects of comparable size. The Seikan tunnel in Japan cost--in current money--some 10 billion dirhams. It is estimated that the tunnel under La Mancha (about 50 km) will cost at least 6 billion dirhams, even using the least costly design. These are only orders of magnitude, for the very notion of cost is difficult to pin down until the nature of the project has been spelled out. There is a difference between a tunnel and a bridge, between a one-track railroad tunnel and a two-track tunnel.

[Question] One sure benefit for Morocco: The project is a chance for Moroccan technicians and cadres to get new training and experience....

[Answer] In fact, it is a chance to enlist the participation of Moroccan researchers and cadres in a high-technology project and to familiarize them with the most diverse techniques. Highly skilled nationals in a number of technical branches are participating in this project. SNEP will try to involve people in every field, in both the private sector and the academic world.

[Question] The proposed fixed link across the Straits will turn Morocco into a tree with its roots in Africa and its foliage in Europe....

[Answer] The project does highlight the key position Morocco occupies, with shorelines on the Mediterranean in the north and on the Atlantic in the west, responsible along with Spain for guarding the Strait, which is one of the most important passages and maritime lanes in the world. We will take great pride in building this project, which testifies to the strategic position our country occupies.

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CSO: 5200/5002

## PFLO LEADER DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S SITUATION, INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Havana TRICONTINENTAL in Spanish No 77, Jul-Aug 81 pp 6-20

[Interview with Abd-Al Aziz al-Qadi, secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), by Rodolfo Cassals; somewhere on the Arabian peninsula; date not given: "Oman: Toward the Constitution of a Broad Democratic Front"]

[Text] One of the points of interest for any newspaper reporter who visits the Mideast is without a doubt the situation in Oman (310,000 sq km and barely 2 million inhabitants), where Sultan Qabus, a front for Anglo-American neocolonialism, exercises a ferocious tyranny with the help of imperialist and mercenary troops.

Located in the extreme southeastern part of the Arabian peninsula, its privileged geographical situation--with coasts on the Arabian Sea and the Guld of Oman and control over the Strait of Hormuz, on the so-called "petroleum route"--has made Oman a very appetizing morsel for imperialists interests: first Great Britain, and then the United States, both of which maintain large military bases there, as well as a sizeable and menacing naval air force.

The Omani people have never agreed with this "destiny" that its enemies have tried to impose on it. After long years of political struggle, the armed struggle for liberation began on 9 June 1965, led by its vanguard, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).

Unable to contain the popular rebellion, which had gathered considerable strength in the Qara's Mountains in the southwestern province of Dhofar, the sultan begged reinforcements from the British military garrison there. New special and mercenary troops were sent, and later, complying with instructions from Washington, the former shah of Iran dispatched an expeditionary force of several thousand men armed with modern weapons and several airplanes and armed helicopters. The war of extermination and scorched earth spread throughout all Dhofar. The imperialists, whose propaganda had for a long time silenced the Oamni people's struggle for true independence, then talked of "great victories." They even claimed that the insurrection had been stifled forever.

But once again they were mistaken.

On the Arab Peninsula we met Abd-al Aziz al-Qadi, the most admired leader of the Omani people. Mutual friends had arranged the interview, which took place over tea at a small table amid modest surroundings.

The secretary general of the PFLO, a man of medium height, slender, with black hair and moustache, began the dialogue with the reporters. First he sent an emotional greeting to Cuba and its leaders, expressing his faith and confidence in the Cuban people's ability to confront and defeat the imperialist maneuvers and to develop and deepen its socialist revolution.

"Cuba, under the leadership of Fidel Castro," he said, "is present in millions and millions of people throughout the world, including the Omani people, and it has the support of all the progressive and democratic forces of humanity." Then Abd-al Aziz al-Qadi proceeded immediately to analyze his country's dependent situation:

"Oman is going through abnormal circumstances which differentiate it from other countries in the region. The real political power there continues to be in the hands of British imperialism which, because of its historical relations with the sultanate, continues to interfere in the country's internal affairs.

"On 23 July 1970, the British replaced Sultan Said ben Taimur with his son, Qabus, and tried to make the resignation appear normal. Following instructions from his masters, the new sultan tried to replace the national hymn, flag and government and began to work to make the country a member of the Arab League and the United Nations, but he did not mention suspension of the agreements which gave Great Britain military facilities to 'protect' Oman."

[Question] Then the accusations concerning the establishment of foreign bases are true?

[Answer] The English military bases were already in Oman before 1970, and those on Masirah Island and others are still being used. The sultan also continued to employ the army officers who took part in the events of that year, and at present many of those officers are still in positions of authority. However, the high-ranking officers of the Omani army are English; that is, the heads of the air force, navy and army. There are English military commanders even down to the battalion, company and squad levels.

[Question] How about military units and advisers from other countries?

[Answer] The British have a special force of soldiers in Oman. Until 1976, those troops numbered about 5,000 distributed among three bases, but in recent years, and especially since the fall of the shah of Iran, the British have stepped up their military activity in Oman and increased their troops to 8,000 soldiers. That is a direct and special force under command of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the British have also increased the number of their officers and advisers, and there are now some 13,000 counting military commanders, advisers and soldiers, which shows that the English presence and its interference is not decreasing, but rather is increasing more and more.

There are also Egyptian and Jordanian troops in Oman, but those forces only act as advisers to Qabus's soldiers.

[Question] What has been the effect of the sultan's policy of surrendering the national sovereignty to imperialism?

[Answer] Obviously, it has been the internal isolation of the Omani regime, the result of the emerging awareness by the masses of the true situation. British and American imperialism have taken on the task of strengthening the sultanate militarily as a result of the situation created in the area by the fall of the shah.

They see their interests in that region threatened and are increasing their activities in Oman, not only to defeat the desire the liberation, but also to train the regime to play a predetermined role against other countries in the area.

[Question] In recent years the American imperialists have been pressuring Qabus to allow them to establish military bases in the country. Is that part of this policy?

[Answer] During 1978, 1979 and 1980, the United States sent four military delegations to negotiate the installation of military bases in Oman. Some of those delegations remained in the country several months and visited the bases at Salalah, Masirah, Khazar, Zambrit, Beit al Falay and Sib.

At the end of 1979, Oman and the United States reached an agreement in principle on "economic and military cooperation," and the PFLO decided at that time to publicize and denounce the negotiations, while the sultanate tried to deny them. However, in 1980 the United States began to make official statements concerning the facilities that Oman had given it, and on 4 June 1980 the agreement was formally signed and made public under the title, "Agreement for Economic and Military Cooperation Between the United States and Oman."

[Question] What did those agreements contain?

[Answer] Some of the articles of the agreement were published and others remained secret. Among the published provisions is concession to the United States, should it be considered necessary, of the use of land and naval bases already existing in Oman, as well as facilities for storing war munitions and medical supplies.

Among the secret agreements, the PFLO was able to ascertain that the United States will have the potential to use the Masirah base permanently, to install another naval air base at Khazar, in the Strait of Hormuz, and an espionage center on the Island of Om Alganah, also in that strait. Likewise, Qabus gave the Americans the right to exercise total authority in Musandam Province, on the Arabian Gulf.

[Question] They say there are several thousand Yankee soldiers in Oman. Is the exact number known?

[Answer] The number of American soldiers in Oman varies, due to the fact that their naval fleet in the area is in the Gulf of Oman as well as in the Arabian Gulf. The estimate at this time is about 10,000 but not all of them are stationed in Oman. Those who are in the country are concentrated in Masirah and in Musandam and have the people of the latter under their control.

In addition, according to the agreements between the United States and Oman, Yankee imperialism is going to construct warehouses in Masirah, Zambrit and other points within the sultanate, and it will pay Qabus a total of \$500 million. From these expenditures one can deduce that the United States is doing all it can to make



Oman an important American base, a prospect confirmed by the installation of bases on Masirah and Om Alganam and by the facilities that Qabus has given the Americans in the ports of Azit and Salalah.

[Question] What is the country's economic situation?

[Answer] As is known, Oman has a single-product economy. Petroleum, the chief source of income, is controlled by foreign interests. Dependence on petroleum is such that of a national income of 520 million rials (1 rial equals \$2.50), 455 million come from crude oil and the remaining 65 million from agriculture and Saudi assistance.

After Qabus assumed power he undertook, following instructions from Great Britain, to build some schools, hospitals, electrical power projects, water wells, etc., to make the people think the new government was concerned and so to induce them to take a position against the liberation movement and in favor of the regime. In recent years, however, the regime has not been able to continue with those "reforms," and unemployment, emigration and illiteracy have increased as a result.

By the end of 1977, petroleum production had begun to show a decline, to the extent that while 380,000 barrels per day were being extracted 4 years ago, today only 300,000 to 310,000 barrels are being produced. The situation has been aggravated by the intensification of the sacking and exploitation of economic resources without concern for conservation, by the increase of misappropriation of public funds by officials and by lack of planning.

In spite of aid to the Omani budget from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, in 1978 there was a deficit of 50 million rials and in 1979 a deficit of 80 million.

[Question] To what extent has this policy affected the popular masses?

[Answer] As a result of the opening of the regime to foreign capital, there has been a displacement of Omani workers. There is a great exodus of peasants, craftsmen and livestock farmers to the cities, because the majority of the peasants have lost their lands, craftsmen have lost their jobs because of foreign competition and the cattlemen are threatened by meat imports.

The capitalist firms, which bring in labor from South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan and other places, receive all sorts of facilities from Qabus and do not respect the interests of the peasants, fishermen and other Omani workers. These sectors, seeing their means of livelihood gone and that they are swelling the unemployment rolls, are those, basically, who emigrate to the cities. Some have enlisted in Qabus's army to be able to sustain their families and other emigrate in search of work.

On the other hand, all union institutions which might defend the rights of the workers are banned in the country. There is no constitution to protect the interests of the people; strikes and demonstrations are prohibited and to engage in them is considered a crime.

So there is only one way open to the people: illegal revolutionary activity, and the PFLO's reorganization work toward independence occupies an essential place in this task.

[Question] What other revolutionary forces are there in Oman, and what methods of struggle do they use?

[Answer] Sultan Qabus's government prohibits the activities of mass organizations, and therefore the PFLO has begun the task, in the last few years, of secretly organizing the peasants and other workers and linking them politically to the front.

In addition to the PFLO there are in Oman:

The Arab Omani Labor Party, a small organization created in 1970. It is organized in some areas, but it does not participate in any public struggle, nor does it play any role in the revolutionary struggle which is going on. There is also a small, disorganized Nasserite organization, located mainly in Gafar. The Labor Party and the Nasserites are nationalist elements who do not accept either Qabus or the foreign presence.

There is also the Imam Galeb Association, which has a tribal and religious influence in some areas, mostly in Nazuak and Jabal. This association is also against foreign interference and the sultan.

In 1980 the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oman appeared. It has ties with the Iranian Shi'ites (the number of Shi'ites in Oman is about 3 or 4 percent of the entire population). The Islamic Front is composed of a small group of students influenced by the Iranian revolution. They are against the Yankees, the British and Qabus, but they are a uniquely religious movement. This Islamic Front has been organized also in North Yemen, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, because the Khomeini victory in Iran has served to bolster the religious movements in the Arab countries.

A few months ago the Islamic Front issued a statement attacking Qabus and the foreign presence and demonstrated in favor of the PFLO struggle.

All these small organizations have a limited presence in the area, and they are not carrying on any struggle against the government; but the PFLO believes that they do constitute a nationalist position opposed to the sultan.

To date the Omani people have known only two political forces: the reactionary government and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. The other organizations have proclaimed that the only political force that can achieve the objective of independence is the PFLO, and for some time there have been contacts between those organizations and the PFLO, which has been trying to organize them into a unified political base so that a single line may be adopted in confronting the regime.

[Question] On what principles is the effort to unify these forces based?

[Answer] There are three basic objectives toward which we need to work to unite these organizations on a common political base:

- 1) Expulsion of foreign military troops and bases; 2) the achievement of democratic freedoms for the people: the right to unionize, to organize, to hold meetings and to strike; and 3) to take an international position against the Camp David



agreements which are supported by Qabus, and to achieve solidarity with the national Arab movement, especially with the just struggle of the Palestinian people.

These are the three aspects on which the work must be centered, because they are basic goals to be achieved by the Omani people. For the PFLO these goals are a tactical objective and are part of our strategic program. The need to create this common political foundation on which all the people must work stems from the fact that certain Omani leaders, including religious and tribal leaders, have different ideologies; therefore we try to find common goals which interest not only one group, but the entire people.

[Question] What is the essence of the tactical and strategic programs of the PFLO?

[Answer] The PFLO has a complete political program which sets forth in detail all the tasks of the popular struggle phase, from both the internal and the international point of view. This program was approved at the Fourth PFLO Congress in 1974 and includes an outline of how to carry on the struggle at this time as well as when independence is achieved.

Our political program expresses the long-range aspirations of the PFLO and follows along those general lines. It does not outline the work of other forces in the country, but only the political, economic and social tasks of the PFLO. Therefore the basic objective of the minimum program for this phase is to form a broad, unified democratic front, the name for which will be discussed with the other groups. The PFLO will continue to carry out its strategic program and at the same time will try to create that broad unified front, so that it may play its role in the struggle for national independence.

Dialogue and contacts are being made between the PFLO and the other groups, and when an agreement is reached it will be made public. The Imam Galeb Association and the Labor Party, for example, have already come out in favor of the basic program and the PFLO proposes to contact all the other leaders and tribal chiefs who are against the foreign presence and Qabus.

[Question] How about the political and military situation of the PFLO? What are its immediate and medium-range tasks?

[Answer] For 3 years not the PFLO has not considered, among its plans, a broad military confrontation with the government, and during this time it has worked at the task of strengthening its internal organization, creating a strong popular base, and when that is consolidated it will join the battle again.

In a complete review of past work, very valuable lessons were learned from the mistakes made. We must take advantage of these experiences in order not to repeat the same errors: The armed struggle of the PFLO, when it is carried out without an organization suited to the policy to be followed, can work against the consolidation of the front.

It was decided first to strengthen the organization, so that we might take advantage of the armed struggle later on. In our circumstances, when the guerrillas are concentrated in a single area (Dhofar), it is easier for the enemy to find and eliminate them. Now that the PFLO is strengthened in all areas, when it takes up the guerrilla war in several places at once, it will be much harder for the enemy to destroy it.

The armed struggle was concentrated in Dhofar and was very weak in other places. For that reason, we are now working on the organization of the front throughout the country, so that we can launch the armed struggle not only in Dhofar, but in other areas of the country.

The armed struggle in Oman must be balanced with the development and strengthening of the mass political movement, because if this is not done, it will fail. The PFLO is not only dedicated to strengthening itself, but also to achieving this mass political movement. That is why we put so much emphasis on the creation of popular, worker, peasant and student organizations--because unless they are created, that mass political task cannot be achieved. We can say that there are already in the country the National Workers Committee of Oman, the National Student Union of Oman, the Omani Student Organization and the Omani Women's Organization.

At this time, the PFLO has a military presence in Dhofar, but it does not plan to take a large part in any fighting, except in case of attack. That armed force is for training and self-defense, and it goes into combat only in case of necessity. The program for these forces was set up in the PFLO's strengthening phase, which has three basic points:

- 1) To devote itself to political work among the masses; 2) to create networks of contacts in the country and in the cities; and 3) to defend itself when attacked by the enemy.

[Question] Since the Front's Fourth Congress there have been substantial changes in the national situation. How does the PFLO plan to confront them?

[Answer] We are already beginning to prepare for the PFLO's Fifth National Congress, and at the end of last September we held a general assembly of the front's leadership with the local leadership and other cadres, in which an agenda for the forthcoming congress was announced.

Work has begun on the documents to be discussed by the congress. One is related to modification of the earlier political program, since it was approved in 1974 and some important events have occurred since then. During the Fourth Congress it was the British presence and that of the shah of Iran and their influence on Oman. Then the Yankees arrived. Therefore the new political program must take into consideration that American military presence and the dangerous influence of Yankee imperialism on the Qabus government. Therefore we must outline new steps to be taken in the face of the U.S. plans in Oman.

With respect to the internal rules of the PFLO, these will have to be modified at the congress, adding new tasks such as, for example, the PFLO's interest in building a broad democratic front which will group together all the progressive forces in the country and which must carry out its program and strengthen the vanguard.

The third document to be discussed in the Fifth Congress is the political report, which will basically treat the development of the PFLO since the last congress and analyze the national, international and Arab situations and the efforts and work realized by the creation of the broad front. In addition, certainly, the congress will hold elections for a new leadership.

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CSO: 4548/2

## BRIEFS

LUBRICATING OIL PLANT AGREEMENT--Saudi Arabia has signed a \$1bn agreement with two US companies to build a lubricating oil plant at the industrial complex of Jubail on the Gulf coast. The agreement was signed in Riyadh by the state owned Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (Petromin), Texaco and Chevron. The plant is to produce 12,000 barrels of lube oil base stocks per day. Petromin has said the plant, which will also produce 10,000 barrels of asphalt per day, will be in operation by 1983 and reach full capacity three years later. It will export six types of specialised base oil products. The plant is one of five refineries planned by Saudi Arabia in collaboration with international oil companies. Two of them will be at Jubail, two at Saudi Arabia's second industrial complex at Yanbu on the Red Sea and one at Rabigh. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 59]

LOAN TO MALTA--Saudi Arabia is to lend Malta about \$28m Prime Minister Dom Mintoff announced in Valetta last week. He added that some \$14m would go towards building a new shipyard at the Grand Harbour while the rest will help meet the costs of a water desalination project and a telecommunications system. No further details of the loan were announced, but Saudi Arabia agreed in principle to participate in the three Maltese development projects after an official visit by the Maltese prime minister in September, when he had talks with King Khaled. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 41]

MINEFA MAJOR SHAREHOLDER--Minefa Holdings, a Middle East investment group based in Amsterdam, will become the majority shareholder in the Dutch construction group Ballast-Nedam, which recently won a \$564m contract for work on the Bahrain causeway. Minefa, which is owned by Saudi Arabian and other Middle East investors, will take over the 33 per cent holding in Ballast currently held by Antillian Holding Company. The acquisition, valued at \$14.7m will boost its stake to about 70 per cent. The Dutch company, which conducts almost half its operations in Saudi Arabia, is expecting its net profits to rise 12 per cent this year to \$11.38m on a turnover of \$731.7m. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 40]

RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR JUBAYL--Saudi Arabia has awarded a multi-million dollar contract for a maritime surveillance system in the Gulf to the French engineering and electronics firm Thomson CSF. The company said last week that the system would be in operation by late 1982 at Jubail, the Gulf port destined to handle substantial oil tanker and container traffic. Monitoring of ship movements will

be carried out by two radars with ranges of about 25 miles, according to the project's West German consultants Hanseatic Port Systems. One of the radars will be placed on the port's existing control tower, and the other one will be inside a concrete tower to be built on the coral island of Al-Jurayd, some 25 miles offshore. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 p 12]

SAUDI REGISTRY ATTRACTS TANKERS--Many ship-owners are switching to the Saudi Arabian flag in order to take advantage of fuel oil discounts enjoyed by the Saudi fleet, according to the latest issue of LLOYD'S SHIPPING ECONOMIST. At the end of October, a total of 58 vessels had switched to Saudi registration during 1981. The magazine noted that vessels which are at least 51 per cent Saudi-owned, which fly the Saudi flag and which trade with Saudi Arabia can purchase bunker fuel at only one-fifth of normal market prices. The discount would cut the fuel for a very large crude carrier (vlcc) carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia to northwestern Europe and returning in ballast (from \$1.6 million to \$250,000). The discounts are understood to be part of a deliberate Saudi Arabian policy to encourage expansion of its national fleet. Given the tight conditions under which tankers are operating at present and which have resulted in the laying up of a large number of tankers or their use as floating storage tanks, the Saudi move has considerable attractions. In some instances, it offers a way for shippers to stay in business when they might otherwise have been forced to go under. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 4-5]

CSO: 4400/75



POLITICAL SYSTEM OF YEMEN EXAMINED

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French Aug 81, pp 745-768

[Article by Patrick Labaune: "Tribal Democracy and the Political System in the Yemen Arab Republic"]

[Text] The assassinations 8 months apart of the chief of state of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Ibrahim al-Hamdi, on 11 October 1977, and of his successor, Lt Col Ahmad al-Ghashmi, on 24 June 1978, the frontier war with Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 1980, the increase in the number of attempted coups d'etat, the repeated occurrence of mutinies within the armed forces, and the endemic state of war by the tribes against central authority--all of these circumstances throw light on the tensions, both domestic and external, which work on the North Yemen government.<sup>1</sup>

The powerful tribal phenomenon and its after-effects are reportedly part of the essential background of most of the YAR's ups and downs. In any case, this seems to be the view of certain of the Middle East specialists and the majority of the political leaders of North Yemen. The former saw in these explosions of violence the strength of "feudal" power within the tribes belonging to Zaydite Islam,<sup>2</sup> the autocratic and capricious domination of a few, powerful tribal chiefs over a large proportion of the population.<sup>3</sup> From an apparently opposite point of view but leading finally to the same end, the Yemeni leaders have denounced the dangers of tribal power for the maintenance of state unity and its inability to face up to the demands of modernization.<sup>4</sup>

Essentially negative but scientifically doubtful, these views are far from reflecting the totality of the tribal phenomenon. If for the former the absence of experience in the field makes it impossible to read the tribal tea leaves and for the latter the requirements of national development oblige them to downplay the tribal world, anthropological work and the status of a non-participating observer make it possible to avoid these two snags. From another point of view the immediate inclusion of the tribal phenomenon in the category of archaic, feudal, demoniac, or conservative elements disposes a little too rapidly, in our view and in the name of Western-centered dogmatism, the eventual, positive aspects of the phenomenon being discussed. More precisely, this classification does not take into account one of the most original and specific political forms of North Yemeni society, which we might agree to call the democratic forms of the tribes observing Zaydite Islam.

Autopsy of Tribal Democracy

The long-time underground survival of this phenomenon, and then this rebirth of a

singular political tradition, constitute a rather rare exception in the developing countries, for which reason it deserves to be strongly underlined. Although we cannot analyze here the democratic essence of Zaydite Islam,<sup>5</sup> we will try to throw light on some aspects of this tribal democracy and to demystify a certain number of dominant clichés concerning this social organization.

#### The Analysis of Walter von Dostal and Its Shortcomings

Despite the interest and originality of such a phenomenon, and as paradoxical as that may appear, the bibliography on this subject is marked by its sparseness. As a practical matter, only one article by Walter von Dostal describes some features of this tribal democracy, even though his work is concentrated exclusively on the Bani Hushaysh tribe, which lives in the area northeast of the Yemeni capital.<sup>6</sup>

However, this study is not without its shortcomings in terms of our problem. More than an evaluation of the democratic institutions or processes within this tribe, it is an anthropological effort, notably dealing with economic mechanisms, stating the autonomy of tribal society in terms of an external center, which holds the attention of the author. The fact remains that one of the basic principles of tribal democracy reportedly rests on the equality of members of the tribe in the exercise of three institutions defined by tribal law ('urf al-qabili) for men able to bear arms.

The first of these institutions is said to reside in the mediating role of every man in the tribe (qabili) in case of quarrels and is known by the term of hakim.<sup>7</sup> An idealized type of example illustrates this situation of equality:

"Let us take the case of two men involved in a serious quarrel. In such a case a man with the rank of qabili will intervene and invite them to put their curved knives (jambiyah) back into the scabbards. By this procedure the passerby takes the role of a hakim, and the quarrelers are obliged to bow to this request and to put their knives back into the scabbard. From this moment they are in the state called "the return to justice" ('awd al-'addad), that is, they must refrain from any violent action. The meaning of such an arrangement for personal honor (sulh fi-l-wadih), as this expression indicates, is to turn back any aggressive tendency and to prevent any bloody encounter."<sup>8</sup>

The second institution in which the men of the tribe have real equality is that of the rafiq, or "escort of the friends of the tribe."<sup>9</sup> In effect, this devolves from the sovereignty of the tribe over its territory, from the need for juridical provisions for protecting the life and property of the tribe's friends during their stay within the tribal boundaries. These guarantees of protection are carried out by the rafiq. "This function," Dostal states, "can be undertaken by any member of the tribe who agrees to it, after the clarification of the financial arrangement with the friends of the tribe, in order to bear this responsibility defined by tribal law."<sup>10</sup>

Finally, this equality is shown in the institution of the halif, which can be translated by the expression, "partners in the property." Its field of application rests in the relationships between the individuals of different tribes. "A common contract (muhalafah) is drawn up for the protection of the partners' interests in the property (halif) in each of the tribal exchanges on the basis of reciprocity. The power to enter into a muhalafah is left to the free judgment of each member of the tribe."<sup>11</sup>



While supporting us in our view of things, the description of these institutions by Dostal--beyond their identification--as intangible proof of tribal democracy, nevertheless seems to us to be too compartmentalized, too much reduced in scope, and fossilized. As these are limited to some aspects of the daily life of the qabili, there is nothing to prove that other institutions based on tribal law are shared on the basis of equality of rights and exercise among all the members of the tribe. In the second place, analysis reduces the notion of democracy to a simple, institutional relationship of egalitarianism. Finally, and because of this institutional relationship of egalitarianism. Finally, and because of this institutional perspective, Dostal's interpretation does not make into account the eventual changes, which take place with the modification of the external environment of the tribal world, particularly the development of a new, central political sector of a republican type, since the coup d'etat of 26 September 1962, which put an end to the thousand-year long reign of the Zaydite Imams. In other words, the dynamic character of the social situation has been brushed aside.

It also seems more decisive to us for demonstration purposes to base the analysis on the role and the functions of the tribal chief (shaykh). The powers, the choice, and the limits to the latter's authority will make it possible to include at the same time the most characteristic features of tribal democracy--if one advances the view by means of hypothesis that the function of the shaykh is above all the most authoritarian position in the tribal framework which must involve the most precautions--and in this way to set out the possible changes which have taken place in this phenomenon since the establishment of the republic.<sup>12</sup>

#### The Powers of the Shaykh

The type of political organization which one finds the most frequently in the YAR at the level of the basic communities is the centralized tribe in which, within units of various sizes, maintaining more or less loose relationships, authority is relatively concentrated around the shaykh. However, in these Zaydite tribes there is no "strong" authority in the sense that the shaykh would have the power to use force to impose his decisions, because he holds his authority from those whom he governs.

More explicitly, in this tribal community, the power of the tribal chief is, above all, that of the conciliator and the distributor. The primordial role of the shaykh is to protect, by all means authorized by the 'urf, the cohesion of the tribe and to ensure its survival, in both political and social terms. The choices and decisions made rest almost always on the consent of the tribe. If he tries to avoid applying this rule, the men of the tribe can remind him of it violently, going as far as the assassination of the man whom they had elected but who violated the norms in effect. This kind of internal conflict--and very rare it is--nevertheless occurred more frequently during the civil war from 1962 to 1970, which opposed the imam who had been overthrown to the emerging republic. The choice of sides by the shaykh did not automatically coincide with the aspirations of the tribesmen.

We will introduce here two fundamental roles of the shaykh: his military power and his judicial function. His traditional function, in effect, is two-fold: he is the leader in wartime and the judge of his tribe.

In time of war, it is he who raises and commands a troop of soldiers and organizes local defense. However, he is only the first among equals, and his wishes are constantly limited by those of the leaders of the tribe or of the tribal confederation.<sup>13</sup> All major decisions concerning the external life of the tribal group, and particularly those involving peace or war, are made in council. In this case the responsibility is a collective one. In these councils the shaykh does not have a casting vote, nor the power of decision. The general consensus decides it, and the minority is never bound by the decisions of the majority. It is frequently noted that a clan or a tribe will refuse to join in collective action against another clan or another tribe of the same tribal confederation. Nevertheless, it is clear that a shaykh with a strong personality will succeed in imposing his will on all of the tribe, if he feels himself sufficiently supported. With the civil war and the attempts at infringement of tribal rights by the central government, seeking to establish its authority at the national level, the functions of the shaykh as a military leader have been consolidated. The tribe (qabila) is, in effect, "a more political than economic group, whose existence is only taken to the limits which compose it when one or several of them feel themselves threatened."<sup>14</sup> The increase in external threats to the tribal group since 1962 has reduced the decisions of the shaykh in this area. Once the decision is made, it is the various regions, and entire peoples, who enter into a state of war or peace.

In time of peace the shaykh is the judge of the tribal group. Although he cannot intervene in the daily life of the factions or patriarchal families, on the other hand, in case of murder within the qabila, he establishes the blood price, following the standard established by custom. If, in such a case, compensation cannot be made, he determines the periods of peace between rival factions which limit the exercise of the right of revenge. As a judge, he settles the small disputes in the daily life of the tribe. Thus, generally, every afternoon the shaykh holds his court of justice, the majlis, open to all and charged with settling all disputes. This court of justice has a very old egalitarian basis. All men consider themselves to be equal, and it is they who have delegated to the tribal chief the powers he possesses as an arbiter. Each of the parties involved speaks in turn before hearing him pronounce sentence, in principle without right of appeal, in the framework of the constraints of tribal law and Islam. The shaykh has no other choice, faced with the multiple, small or large conflicts, than to comply, because it is by his capacity to settle disagreements that his power perpetuates itself.

The fact remains that we should avoid considering this judicial power turned over to the tribal chief in the sense in which we understand it in the West. In this anarchical and amorphous setting the notion of authority hardly exists. And any judgment rendered by the shaykh can always be purely and simply ignored, if the judge does not have sufficient force behind him to ensure execution of the verdict. Finally, in rendering his judgment the shaykh is often assisted, in this case also, by a council of tribal and religious leaders.

The powers of the chief of the tribe considerably limited, and their exercise depends essentially on his personality and on the extent of his support. In this sense there is no strong and powerful coercive authority in these Yemeni tribes. The power of the shaykh is very far from being absolute, his role being that of a conciliator and an umpire. Moreover, the title of supreme chief of a tribal confederation (shaykh al-masha'ikh) seems to be an honorific position without a

political foundation and without real authority outside his own tribe, since the chief who holds this position is not always certain of making himself heard by those who freely chose him. His role is limited to leading the tribal confederation in time of war.

#### The Election of a Tribal Chief

We can see even more clearly the reduced extent of the authority of the shaykh by studying the procedure for acceding to this position. Generally, the choice of the tribal chief follows a democratic process, despite some restrictive rules which alter the model here and there.

This way of choosing the chief is lost in history. The oldest known example is the choice of the Mukarrib of the kingdom of Saba (8th to 6th centuries B C). Their chiefs were then chosen from among the noble families. In parallel fashion, but hierarchically lower-ranking, an interesting institution in the pre-Islamic kingdoms of Southern Arabia seems to have been eponymous power. The chiefs of certain clans, called kabir, took turns in exercising certain juridical or religious functions for a previously determined period of time. Official acts were often dated in terms of the year of their office. Related to the same eponymous institution, there was a kind of council which brought together the representatives of the different tribes and made decisions on taxes and irrigation.<sup>15</sup>

Without automatically seeing a resurgence of past actions in the present, a certain continuity in terms of this way of designation of the tribal chief can be seen in the present tribal mosaic. The shaykh is often elected by his equals in the individual families, called mashaykh, within which this duty is hereditary.<sup>16</sup> However, and with a view to the result of our inquiry, non-transmission of the political functions within the tribe by means of family succession is the rule and the guarantee of control of political decisions by the elected representative. In other words, power cannot be exercised without control by the voting tribal members, that is, by the men capable of bearing arms, which excludes certain castes considered inferior.<sup>17</sup>

The fact remains that it is difficult to phrase a general rule on this matter: the designation of the shaykh does not appear to follow the same rule from one tribe to another. To illustrate this, among the Bani Hushaysh: "A village chief (shaykh al-qarya) is elected by the inhabitants of the village. For the election of the leader of a tribal unit, the chief of a tribe of 12 villages or inhabited areas (shaykh al-thuman), an assembly of men having the right to vote will be called by the village chiefs of the thuman...For the position of chief of the tribe, the candidate will be elected from among the tribal chiefs of the thuman. In all these elections a simple majority (aghlal al-akthar) is decisive."<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, among the Hashid, according to Joseph Chelhod, "the decision must be made by unanimity. If, despite the efforts made to reach total agreement, a difference of opinion remains within the assembly, a majority, even a simple majority, is not enough. Such a majority could not claim to impose its will. To bring the minority to give its consent, use is then made of very effective pressure which deserves being mentioned because of its originality: to bring the opposition into line, the majority group goes to visit them as guests and remains there as long as

the opposition exists. Although this hospitality is imposed on them, the conventions are maintained, in spite of everything, of attending to the needs of their unwelcome guests."<sup>19</sup>

However, there is general agreement in stating that an element outside the tribal group cannot intervene in the election. Even the shaykh of a tribal confederation cannot oppose the election of a clan chief. That would be a political error which he would not commit.

Nevertheless, the process may encounter a certain number of obstacles which reduce by that extent the democratic impact of the election. A son of a shaykh, for example, if he is an individual with a strong personality, and if the tribe considers that he would represent it properly, has every chance to become chief of the tribe on the death of his father. It may also be that the men of the tribe would refuse him and give their votes to another candidate. That happens most often in tribes where two families of almost equal importance vie for a position of pre-eminence. In order not to create hatred and tension, the men very wisely choose their leader now from one family and then from the other. If these practices restrict the number of candidates and, consequently, the workings of democracy, they are logical in terms of the spirit of the future role played by the shaykh: protecting the cohesion of his qabila by every means. It would be paradoxical for the election of the chief of the tribe to be the object of divisions and of conflicts within the tribe, although these exist.

#### A Legitimacy of Questioning

Once elected, the shaykh rarely sees his legitimacy truly shaken. Unless he has made serious mistakes, inertia wins over change, and the chief of the tribe is retained in power: the eternal past wins. The tribal people tend to legitimize the people in place and elected according to the rules, to respect what has always been the case, to consider what is routine as an inviolable norm. Here we see Weber's conception of the legitimacy of traditional power.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, as we have noted, this phenomenon of perpetuation in power is supported, in certain cases, by that of political heredity.

However, it would be naive to believe that elections and the legitimacy of this traditional authority are never challenged. The mechanisms for challenging tribal authority are there to be used, to the extent that they make it possible to restore the true dimensions of a phenomenon which is generally under-estimated or passed over in silence.

Internal and permanent conflicts between the tribes already cause a violent competition for the leading positions. All the electoral assemblies are thus accompanied by interminable discussions where antagonisms turn against each other and where the candidates show their tactical or oratorical qualities. Moreover, to avoid bloody conflict, the participants must turn over their weapons, and especially their firearms, to the shaykh of the place where the assembly is held. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the authority of the shaykh somewhat hides the competition which exists between the different candidates able to contend for the title which is at the top of the tribal organization. In effect, this could not hide the fact that there is a permanent competition for power which in general goes on clandestinely between



mashaykha families and according to precisely defined rules. Certainly, and if unanimous agreement is not automatically reached, there is hardly any place in these Zaydite tribes for disagreement to be expressed in the form of open opposition to the power of the shaykh. The struggle among the Bakil for the title of shaykh al-masha'ikh of this tribal confederation reveals this silent, subterranean competition which is difficult, it is true, for the observer to appreciate.

As power is exerted in the settlement at the least cost of the conflicts within the tribal group and in the protection of the latter against the material or human dangers which may come from the outside, the opposition to the chief of the tribe can only be expressed by indirect ways and therefore ends as much in the strengthening of his authority as in its weakening.<sup>21</sup> Opposition can show itself in the refusal to recognize authority any longer. This is a refusal which inevitably involves, at the level of the tribal confederation, the secession of one or several tribes and, at the level of a single tribe, the secession of one or several subtribal groups ('ashira).

This opposition is also legitimized by its justification of social stratification. Although the latter is close to a caste system, nevertheless the shaykh does not have the status of an untouchable, either from the political or religious point of view, even if his election takes place, most often, through the use of the Friday prayers. The troubles encountered by the Egyptian expeditionary corps sent to the YAR, in supporting the tottering republic from 1962 to 1967, have validated this remark. The Egyptian forces, thinking they could control a tribe by the arrest or the assassination of its leader, were cherishing illusions. They couldn't intimidate a tribe by imprisoning or executing its leaders: we could be tempted to state the opposite is true.

Finally, the shaykh can see his authority questioned for reasons of personality, or rather of the political course adopted toward the central government. In effect it is appropriate to emphasize this function of the shaykh, the sole spokesman of the tribe in its relations with the government authorities, the most important element in the system of relationships between the government of San'a', on the one hand, and the tribal world, on the other. Thus, his attitude toward the government contains a thread by means of which the opposition--simultaneously possible and potential--can show itself more freely. The fall of the Zaydite Imam in 1962, for some families, was also an opportunity used to "dethrone" the shaykh. A well-known example is often mentioned to illustrate this situation: that of the al-Ghashmi family, which eliminated the Massaldi family within the Hamdan al-Yaman tribe. The Massaldi shaykh had received Imam Badr following the coup d'etat of 26 September 1962 and, in that way, had committed himself in favor of the imam without having received the consent of the community of qabili.

That is to say that, beside the traditional legality there also exists a legitimacy of opposition to established authority. The tribal society of North Yemen is therefore a competitive society where the leaders are selected by elections. Competition, even if it is restricted, nevertheless exists. This explains why you do not find in this region a single case of a shaykh in office by right of conquest. Moreover, if that were the case, the domination exercised by a tribal chief would have nothing in common with that exercised by traditional chiefs: the regime established would be purely feudal and coercive.<sup>22</sup>



## A New Interpretation of the North Yemeni Political System

Although the analysis up to the present has been based on the description of some aspects of tribal leadership and its democratic variations, we would now like to reintegrate this fact into an overall view of North Yemeni political life. This kind of insertion will be all the more delicate as the too rare political science studies on this subject have largely ignored this variable, as we have said, and discussed the republican political regime now being built as the product of developments coming from outside this society.

### Tribal Democracy, Civil War, and End of the Conflict

Despite different angles of attack, the analysis of the North Yemeni civil war (1962-1970) and of its outcome are summarized as the consequence of a strategic contest simultaneously at the regional and world level. These different forms of presentation involve either descriptive articles,<sup>23</sup> the law and international organizations and more generally foreign policy,<sup>24</sup> or finally borrowing from the theory of dependence and notably the works of Jean Lagadec,<sup>25</sup> not to mention the inevitable and obsolete studies on the clash between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.<sup>26</sup>

The authors of these studies "regionalize" the conflict by analyzing the close military or ideological links which unite the republican side and Nasir's Egypt, and, on the other hand, the resistance of the imam to Saudi Arabia, his natural source of support. Elsewhere, they raise the conflict to the "world" level by raising the impact of Soviet-American antagonism. In other words, a civil war in a framework which, consequently, goes beyond it. These approaches, even if they do not state it openly, have a pronounced, systematic aftertaste. More precisely, according to this interpretation, the United States and the Soviet Union each reportedly has a sub-system under it (Saudi and Egyptian). The sub-systems also have their own sub-systems (the imam and the republic).

Without totally denying this vision of things and its partial pertinence to our analysis, we would object first to concealing the conflict as a moment in the historical process of Yemen. Then, even if the studies mentioned take into account, here or there, "domestic" explanations of the conflict, the tribal element and even more its democratic essence and its implications have been largely left out of these discussions.

Now, if the forces of the deposed imam were able to resist for nearly 8 years the joint attacks of the republican and Egyptian armed forces, thanks, it is true, to the financial and material subsidies of the Riyadh government, their remaining in the political struggle is also due in very large part to the support of the numerous Zaydite tribes. Disillusioned and irritated by the new regime, the tribes were expecting from the republic the establishment of a political system where the mechanisms of traditional democracy would be transposed to the national level. Didn't the term "republic" imply the establishment of a representative system? Avoiding or not mentioning this desire, the regime of Marshal Sallah (September, 1962, to November, 1967) over the months lost its contact with the tribal world--inclined, at the beginning, to support it--and wound up by finding itself isolated in its palace by the water-tight precautions of its Egyptian guard.

In this context of limitation of resources to the tribes, opposition both to the republican as well as the imam's side was little by little to rebalance the bi-polarized political system and put an end to the conflict. The development of this third force and its strengthening until it seized power in November, 1967, was to be determined by the desire to integrate the democratic aspirations of the tribal people into its program. This movement was to align itself on the positions decided on at the Amran conference in November, 1963, which demanded, among other things, an elected national assembly.

It would be too simplistic to describe this acceptance of the tribal positions as a strategy aimed at using the rivalries between the various tribal groups for the simple conquest of power.<sup>27</sup> From another point of view this would mean reducing the impact of this commitment to stating that this third force, in view of the fear that the developing republican regime would further alienate the tribal forces, was only a favorable alternative to an opening in their direction. Regarding the possible impact of world and regional antagonisms on the end of the conflict, it was not effective following a double disengagement. First of all, with the failure and withdrawal of the UN Mission in September, 1964, the Soviet Union and the United States, as Jean Lagadec recalls it, "abandoned the negotiated area which was henceforth left to the Arabs."<sup>28</sup> In the second place the Khartoum agreements of August, 1967, were to involve the withdrawal of Egyptian forces, leaving only North Yemeni forces face to face for a solution of the conflict. In other words, the resolution of the armed conflict became, as of that date, an internal matter within the borders and for the leaders of the Yemeni state.

That is the result of a double convergence of events which took place in the tribal crucible. The republic, on the one hand, provoked a new dynamic in this centuries-old political tradition, by liberating the tribal forces held back during the period of the imams (notably by an ingenious system of hostages), as was apparent in the repeated crises which arose in the course of the last 2 decades between the tribes and the central government. On the other hand, and parallel to it, there emerged in the forefront of the political scene elite figures marked by their historical and social environment, in the image of the religious judges (qadat; qadi is the singular form). These were Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Muhammad al-Zubayri, and Shaykh Ahmad Numan. A nationalism revived by the presence of the Egyptian expeditionary corps and the memory of tribal institutions and mechanisms depended at the same time on the supporters of this third force, because of their local or regional origins, without reflecting the weight of Western democratic ideology.<sup>29</sup>

Once in control of the central government, the leaders of the third force became involved in a process which was based on the principles and the needs of tribal democracy. Only then did it seem possible for political activity to be organized, to express itself, and to orient itself by having recourse to this old concept of power. In the first stage, in addition to the adoption of the concept of power jointly exercised, a National Council (Majlis al-Watani) was created in December, 1968, including 45 masha'ikh (plural of shaykh) and which would act as a legislative body. The establishment of this Council coincided with the progressive rallying to the republican regime of the Zaydite tribes (Murad, Bani Harith, Bani Matar, a few clans of the Khawlan tribe, etc) and also of leading figures of the royalist camp, as, for example, General Qasim al-Muntasir in January, 1969, who for many months had posed a constant threat to Sana, and Ahmad al-Shami, minister of foreign

affairs under Imam Badr. As the latter had become a leader without followers, he had to resign himself to exile, thus putting an end to the civil war.

With these movements in support of the republic and the division of the central political apparatus with the masha'ikh and the former supporters of the imam, the National Council assumed new powers (notably the right to withdraw its confidence in the government and to relieve the prime minister of his office), and the number of its members went up from 45 to 63. The behavior of this council and its success would make it possible to overcome the last pockets of resistance and the consequences of the war. A spiralling process developed, tending toward a democratic form of government. With the embryo of a parliamentary democracy in place, the latter was strengthened when the Zaydite tribes rallied to its support. By a chain reaction the democratic aspects of the political system grew.

The model was to be completed with the first general elections in North Yemeni history on 10 March 1971, for the election of 159 members of a National Assembly (Majlis al-Shura), elected by males over 18 years of age.<sup>30</sup> It is generally estimated that the tribal chiefs occupied about 70 percent of the seats,<sup>31</sup> and that domination took concrete form with the election of the shaykh al-mash'ikh of the Hashid tribe, 'Abd Allah al-Ahmar as president of this Assembly. By their support of the republican government the tribes proved their profound desire to play the democratic game. In this sense the government succeeded in its effort to achieve national integration by means of the participation of the Zaydite tribes, which up to then had been actively in rebellion against its authority.

Even more, the elections of March, 1971, and the establishment of the Majlis al-Shura marked the victory of the tribal front. Our previous arguments tended to conclude that representative democracy constituted more specifically a value of the tribal sector than a rule of the central government. The adhesion of these northern and eastern tribes only really took place with the central government taking this democratic ideal into consideration. The commitment of the central government was facilitated, it is true, by the predominance of the religious judges (qadat) within the government apparatus. These figures felt better than anyone the aspirations of the tribal bloc. In other terms, the Majlis al-Shura should not be interpreted as a representation of the new values of the central government, but rather as the transposition of the ideological foundations of the Zaydite tribes. In a way this was a true example of the transmigration of the democratic values and rules of the tribal groups to the core of the national entity.

#### Tribal Democracy and the Militarization of the Political System

From the very fact of this over-representation of the masha'ikh in the National Assembly, we should consider, without any illusions, the ambivalent role of this institution. It was simultaneously an outlet for a divided tribal opposition and also the affirmation of tribal power in the national political field. The tribal chiefs, by their position and by their participation in national political life, were to create the conditions for a new, stronger position for their political encroachments. Many members of their families were to hold governmental cabinet positions and administrative posts and to climb rapidly the various echelons of the military hierarchy.<sup>32</sup> The penetration of the masha'ikh at all levels of society, civilian and military, and the consequent practice of nepotism resulting from this

involvement were constant factors under the regime of Caid (qadi) Iryani (November 1967 - June 1974). Faced with this general assault, would the central government, or at least some of the figures composing it, react?

We can easily interpret the new entry of the armed forces into political life, at the time of the coup d'etat of 13 June 1974, as a reaction to this encroachment. In effect the military officers, symbols of national unity as in most of the transitional societies, looked on this assembly without pleasure as an instant of the tendencies tearing the country apart, even if, and that was to its credit, it had made it possible to transform antagonisms on the battlefield into verbal clashes. More precisely, the North Yemeni Army was then claiming fully its double function, that is, defense and the management of the country. The key words used by the new regime to express its objectives were built around two concepts; unity and political stability, on the one hand, and economic modernization, on the other hand. The former was aimed at tribal dissidence, which was constantly denounced. The latter envisaged the economic takeoff of the country in terms of the model well-known in the West. Despite this analytical distinction, the two concerns were closely linked. In the eyes of the military only economic development would permit the "detrribalization" of the country. On the other hand this would then permit political stability, in turn making possible an increase in foreign aid and investments which the government should assure and encourage. Thus, the strategy of action envisaged rested in the destruction of the institutions invaded by the tribes, which were a sign of national disunity, of a brake on economic development, and of governmental instability (11 governments in less than 7 years under the regime of Caid Iryani).

In this direction and tending to play the role of umpire between the different sectors of society, the military, from the time they took power, "froze" the institution where the opposing clans clashed publicly. While rejecting the alternative of parliamentary democracy demanded by the tribes, the central government under military control nevertheless did not completely dismiss the concept of democracy from its political program, but rather proposed a new form of democracy which would not be subject to tribal control.<sup>33</sup> The suspension and then the suppression, in October, 1975, of the representative system led inevitably to increased tensions between the tribes and the military authorities.

In a purely tribal system the tendency toward unification, as we have said, shows itself when the threat of an external danger is in sight. Faced with the decisions by the central government, considered disturbing for their traditional political values and their partial control of the central government, the tribal chiefs did not hesitate to join forces to halt such proceedings. When, by definition, the tribal world is divided into as many elements as there are tribes, there appeared, with the dissolution of "their" National Assembly, a process of tribal concentration. This phenomenon took concrete form at the time of the second Khamir Conference on 7-8 November 1975, whose importance should be underlined. Old tribal rivalries and differences then tended to be sunk in a common framework for the defense of representative democracy, while challenging the right of the military to dissolve the National Assembly.

The successive rebellions of the Hashid tribes, under the leadership of Shaykh al-Ahmar in February, 1976, in the fall of the same year, and then in July 1977 and January 1978, had no other objective than the holding of general elections. These



rebellions owed their legitimacy among the tribal people as much to their opposition to the order established by the military as to their collective struggle for parliamentary democracy. Beyond the classic stereotypes on this subject the community of the masha'ikh was far from being reduced to being leaders without followers, feudal chiefs cut off from their social foundations, or elite groups based on force and constraint. Parliamentary representation and its defense played the role of contributing to the cohesion and immediate mobilization of all of the Yemeni tribal community, while at the same time constituting one of the primary causes of the chronic instability of the country.

For most of the observers the assassination of the chief of state, Lt Col Ibrahim al-Hamdi in October, 1977, could be explained almost exclusively by his lack of success in detaching the YAR from Saudi influence. His efforts, already well advanced, at establishing a dialogue with the Marxist regime in Aden for the unification of the two Yemens reportedly made the Saudi court in Riyadh decide to hatch the plot. This version of events should not be ignored in considering the Yemeni situation. It remains nonetheless true that one of the plausible hypotheses for the conspiracy reportedly resided in the failure of a policy which aimed at destroying the practices found in tribal democracy, to the benefit of a military dictatorship of the Third World type.

In our opinion this last explanation has a certain credibility in view of events. Designated chief of state on the day following the assassination of President Hamdi, Lt Col Ahmad al-Ghasmi, in order to appease tribal opposition and consolidate his authority, undertook to bring his country toward "a regime of parliamentary democracy," in his own words. To this effect, in February 1978 he appointed 99 deputies to constitute the People's Constituent Assembly. His successor, Lt Col Ali Abd Allah Salih, placed in the same context of a politically precarious position, was to accentuate the involvement of the tribes in this new parliament. Responding to the demands of the northern tribes, he would be forced to accept, in August 1978, the nomination of Sadik Amin Abu Ra's, one of the chiefs of the Bakil tribal confederation, and of Abd Allah al-Ahmar, shaykh al-masha'ikh of the Hashid tribes, as full members of the Assembly. It was symptomatic of the situation that the latter strongly criticized this procedure of designating the deputies by presidential appointment. He called for free elections and appealed to the people "to avoid the return to power of one single man."<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, and after the reactivation of parliamentary forms, the YAR has had domestic political stability, particularly in terms of the tribal front, which is in contrast with the uninterrupted sequence of shattering divisions and violent rebellions during the presidency of Ibrahim al-Hamdi.

We are aware that our analysis only touches on a part of the fabric of the North Yemeni political system. Our object was to depart from the majority of the analyses which sought to present in a global or regional context, in beautifully finished terms, the political phenomena of the YAR. Paradoxically, when Yemen is regarded as a country recently emerged from isolation and whose importance in the international system is reduced to the trivial, the studies devoted to it, generally on the basis of a compilation of data made in the West, essentially bear on its foreign policy. These studies seek either to determine the effects of world events by focusing solely on Yemeni central government figures and actors or by bringing out superficially from the entanglements of this society its impact on the Arabic region, and even eventually on East-West conflict. In the two cases the tribal dimension is skimmed over or ignored.



Although the pertinence of an overall view of the object studied is clear, our analysis has been deliberately stated in terms of the singular nature of our subject, that is, the democratic inclinations of the Zaydite tribes. Now, ignored or discarded by some, presented in the best of cases as a secondary phenomenon or a residue of the archaic aspect of North Yemen, this kind of conduct by an important sector of political society makes it possible to understand the cause of the conflicts originating within the YAR. It seems preferable to us at least to understand the overlapping of events in terms of when they occurred. Finally, and perhaps this is the essential point, this procedure evaluates the traditional norms, values, and forms of behavior which, by their successive impacts, serve to make us understand how the present situation came about.

#### Tribal Democracy and Center-Periphery Paradigm

Can the various conclusions of this analysis contribute to the debate on the center-periphery paradigm, a new conceptual framework much in vogue among political scientists?

1) The North Yemeni example introduces a question mark in the articulation of dependence and of domination in center-periphery relationships. The very word paradigm suggests an idea of hierarchical relationship, of inequality, and of a socio-historic separation between the two political sectors. It is difficult to conceive of the idea that the periphery should have relationships of equality with the center, that it would have specialized rather than subordinate functions, or that it might create political values different from or opposed to those of the center.<sup>35</sup>

According to Edward Shils, considered the pioneer in this matter, the center by definition would be the place for power and values and would hold them exclusively. The periphery, linked to the center, reduced to a simple residue on the way to disappearing, would not have real autonomy in any case. From this point of view we can ask ourselves if this "powerless" sector can be considered to pertain to the political domain. It is true that this view of things is appropriate to this author for whom the myth of consensual societies replaces any other consideration. The object of study is limited to the process of formation of the center, understood as the principal receptacle of the values and the forced dominant in society: the periphery disappears from the problem.

Also, and more generally, we might reproach most of the authors who use this conceptual framework with an analytical tendency which one might call "centro-centrism."<sup>37</sup> By that we mean that even if the author takes under consideration a sector long ignored by French political science and largely isolated, without reference to a center in the various works on the local power structure of American sociology,<sup>38</sup> the peripheral power remains underestimated to the benefit center, to the point that the initially bipolar analytical project is reduced at the end to a single pole analysis.

In the Yemeni framework we will refuse to place such value on the center as to make it the exclusive force for change, the sole decision maker, and the single force crystallizing the values, rules, or processes of the overall social and political system. The application of this paradigm to the YAR weakens the rather fixed concept

of a kind of resignation in the periphery contained in the "centro-centrist" vision. More precisely, three features of the tribal periphery seem to us to go in the direction of this view.

First of all, it is necessary to take into consideration a dynamic process indigenous to the periphery. If we ask, and properly so, about the cleavages, the re-organizations, the modifications, and the changes which affect the structure of the center, the periphery also has such developments. For example, the tribal periphery, as we have seen, evolves between, on the one hand, the lessening of its antagonisms and its regrouping in the face of an external danger or for the defense of parliamentary democracy and, on the other hand, the infinitesimal and conflict-prone divisions, either as a result of historic, religious, or topographical developments or as a result of the practices of the center (manipulation, domination by force, etc). A more detailed empirical analysis would unveil the specific and real potentialities of this peripheral dynamic process.

In the second place, the possible specialized aspects of the periphery, beside those pertaining to the center, tend toward a rebalancing process in terms of the latter. These are specialized aspects which would lead us to depict the periphery as provided with its own administrative authority in its natural zones of control (the shaykh is the judge, the collector of taxes, the first to oppose an administration projected by the center) and with its intrinsic military element through the existence of tribal armed bands competing with the national army. However, above all, and this was the essential point of our argument, the periphery has a kind of ideological specialization from the fact of its developing rules and values distinct from those of the center (tribal law, promotion of a form of democracy).

Finally, and as a corollary to this kind of specialization, "centro-centrism" could encounter its limits if we studied the autonomy of the peripheral area by comparison with the center. Historically, Christina Robin tells us that the Yemeni tribes have always had a wide margin for maneuver by comparison with the pre-Islamic kingdoms.<sup>39</sup> Economically, Walter von Dostal characterizes this autonomy by the exercise of control of the means of production (juwara) by the tribe and by making a distinction between the weekly tribal market (suq)--controlled by a shaykh--where local products make up the bulk of the merchandise, and the permanent city market where imported products have a real monopoly.<sup>40</sup> Sociologically, in view of the impregnation. Peripheral autonomy is shown in depth in the opposition of the nomads to any durable, radical central authority. Thus, it expresses the profound hostility of the tribes toward a political sector whose centralist and autocratic concepts are unacceptable to the sons of the desert.

If we could set out some targets for the elimination of a "centro-centrist" analysis, we would conclude, without being certain of being complete, that the indigenous dynamic processes, specific specializations, and autonomous aspects of the periphery constitute, in our view and for our purposes, the features which most limit peripheral "fatalism."

2) The tripolar concept--center, periphery, and semi-periphery--advanced by Wallerstein<sup>41</sup> and its development into "a quadrimodal system" with the notion of a semi-center proposed by Bernard Corbineau<sup>42</sup> seems to us to make an important contribution to the understanding of the North Yemeni political system. If these two authors

use these concepts in an inter-national or inter-regional problem, we would like to test its reliability quickly at an intra-national level.

These two categories of semi-center and of semi-periphery, beyond the fact that they fragment the dual rigidity of the paradigm, should be understood not only as designating "the articulation of the center and of the periphery" but as partially detached from their respective sectors, without thereby involving a definitive plunge into the opposite sector. Elements pertaining to the central zone, depending on circumstances, will be able to flow back toward the periphery, winding up in the semi-center or, on the contrary, peripheral actors will move toward the center and wind up in the semi-periphery. These movements therefore do not imply in any way a kind of integration in the opposite segment. In this sense these "interlands" are incompletely centralized or integrated into the periphery but retain the characteristics of their sector or origin. On the basis of these clarifications and of this expansion in the hierarchy of the paradigm, we can look for the explanatory pertinence of possible actors who are semi-central and semi-peripheral in the North Yemeni framework, with the preceding, empirical conclusions.

We have commented on the difficulty of placing the qadat, these religious judges who, on the one hand, have by their very essence a clientele and an audience in the peripheral sector and, on the other hand, look like figures of the central elite because of their involvement in the administrative, diplomatic, and political functions of the state apparatus, or at least what passes for it. Political events since the establishment of the republic regime have confirmed their inclination toward this sector, particularly with the assumption of control by the latter under the regime of Caid Iryani and their return to the center of the political scene since the assassination of President Hamdi.<sup>44</sup> If, therefore, these central actors contribute by definition to spread values and institutions, they retain sufficient contact in order not to lose touch with the concerns of the periphery, to the point, as we have noted, that they are preparing the holding of general elections and the constitution of a National Assembly (Majlis). As a point of union between the center and the periphery, imperfectly centralized in particular by their taking into effective consideration the democratic demands of the tribal forces, these qadat look very much like semi-central actors.

On the peripheral side the transposition to the national stage of the democratic aspirations of the tribal world between 1969-1974 and since 1978 is not without impact on this sector. The election or the co-opting of tribal chiefs in the successive National Assemblies has led these figures to acquire the position of privileged spokesmen of the center in its relations with the tribal masses and inversely as well. As a spokesman of the tribal community, the shaykh, by the institutionalization of parliamentary life, becomes--and in addition to his traditional functions--the figure responsible for the "external affairs" of this social group. If for example, the tribe feels the inclination to improve its relations with the political center, or rather feels the need for aid from the latter to assist in its agricultural development, it is the shaykh, simultaneously elected by the tribe (that is, by tribal democracy) and its representative to the San'a' government (that is, with parliamentary democracy), who plays the role of intermediary or, more precisely, the bearer of peripheral claims. In no case does this prejudice his integration with central-oriented ideas. Consequently, the tribal chiefs look to us like personages of the semi-peripheral element, as it is true

that with parliamentary democracy and at the sides of the qudat they hold this essential power as a hyphen between the two poles of society and of the North Yemeni political system, a role which an official appointed and delegated by the central government would normally hold.

The use of these concepts has the advantage of taking into consideration the dynamic processes of the center, as well as those of the periphery. This fragments the possible supremacy of the center. Elsewhere, this provides an explanation of the political system under study. The existence of semi-central and semi-peripheral actors in the political arena and their participation in the system of government attenuate bipolarized conflict and permit the relative stability of North Yemeni society in its national dimensions. The regime of Caid Iryani and of Presidents Ghashmi and Salih illustrate this, without, we should note, ignoring intra-sectoral antagonisms and instability.

Our purpose was to set out some benchmarks for a conceptual framework which, by its elasticity and a form which is still sufficiently supple, "to lend itself to multiple combinations and which can be modified without being disfigured."<sup>45</sup> It goes without saying, however, that our definition and our perception of "center-centrism," our attempt to substitute for its pure form a "quadrmodal" form" evidently require further development, refinement, confirmation, or even contradiction, as it is true that the course of research does not take place in a straight line.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. For more details on these events, refer to the articles by Michel Tuchscherer, "Les deux Yemen en crise" [The Two Yemens in Crisis], *MAGHREB-MACHREK*, July-August-September, 1978, pp 21-25, and "Les six premiers mois du Colonel Saleh a la tete de la Republique Arabe du Yemen, juillet-decembre 1978" [The First Six Months of Colonel Saleh As Leader of the Yemeni Arab Republic, July-December, 1978], *MAGHREB-MACHREK*, January-February-March, 1978, pp 15-20.
2. Zaydite Islam is a branch (firqa) of Shi'ite Islam, now limited only to North Yemen. Islamologists agree in defining this Shi'ite variant as little different from Sunni Islam. For more details on this view of the world and its development in the Yemeni framework, refer to Cornelis van Arendouk, "Les debuts de l'immat zaydite au Yemen: [The Beginnings of the Zaydite System of Imams in Yemen], Leyden, E J Brill, 1960, 376 pages. For a more political view see the work of Abdin (Al. Tayib Zayn Al), "The Role of Islam in the State, Yemen Arab Republic (1940-1972)," Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975; 572 pages.
3. That is at least the interpretation of the different articles of Philippe Rondot, "Influences tribales et forces progressistes au Yemen du Nord" [Tribal Influences et Progressive Forces in Norty Yemen], *MAGHREB-MACHREK*, January-February-March, 1978, pp 10-14; and "L'imbroglia Yemenite" [The Yemeni Imbroglia], *DEFENSE NATIONALE*, December, 1978, pp 79-94.
4. See in particular the speech of President al-Hamdi of 25 September 1977, the text of which was published in the daily newspaper *AL-THAWRA* (of Sanaa), 26 September 1977.



5. On this theme we cite: R Strothmann, "Al-Zaydiya," in "Encyclopedie de l'Islam," Leyden, E J Brill, 1936, vol 5, pp 1264-1266; Ignazio Guidi, "Gli scrittori zayditi el'esegesi coranica mutuzilita," Rome, Typographia del Sento, 1925, "The Zaydi Writers' Interpretation of the Kran According to Mu'tazila" 20 pages; and M M Moreno, "La dottrina zeidita nello Yemen," ["Zaydite Culture in Yemen"] in REVISTA COLONIALE ITALIANE, 1928, pp 687-699 and 1929, pp 281-289, 392-402, 794-796.
6. Walter von Dostal, "Sozio-ökonomische Aspekte der Stammes-demokratie in Nordost Yemen," [Socio-economic Aspects of Democratic Growth in Northeast Yemen] in SOCIOLOGUS, 24 (1), 1974, pp 1-15.
7. This institution has also been noted by Edward Glaser, "Meine reise durch Arhab und Hashid," [My Trip Through Arhab and Hashid] in "Petermann's Mitteilungen," [Petermann's Reports] 30, 1884, pp 176-177, and Ettore Rossi, "Il diritto consuetudinario della tribu arabe del Yemen," ["The Customary Law of the Arab Tribe of Yemen"] in REVISTA DEGLI STUDI ORIENTALI, 33, 1948, p 33.
8. Walter von Dostal, op cit, p 7.
9. See also Carl Rathjens, "Taghut gegen shari'a," in "Jahrbuch des Lindens museums," 1951, p 181.
10. Walter von Dostal, op cit, p 7.
11. Ibid, p 7.
12. On this last point, see the argument of R G d'Abrahams, "The Political Organization of Unyanwezi," Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, 208 pages. The author studies the position of the chief of the tribe and the Manner of accession to this position, in close relationship to the study of Tanganyikian and then Tanzanian developments.
13. In the YAR this generally concerns 2 tribal confederations: the Hashid and the Bakil. See J Schleiffer, "Hashid and Bakil," in "Enclopedie de l'Islam," op cit, vol 3, p 285.
14. Joseph Chelhod, "La parente et le mariage au Yemen," [Relatives and Marriage in Yemen] in ETHNOGRAPHIE, 67.
15. On this institution in Saba, one may read with interest the work of the Soviet Southern Arab specialist, A G Lundin, "Gosudarotivo Mukarribov Saba' ["The Nation of the King of Saba"] (Sabajki eponimat)," Moscow, Nauka, 1971, 301 pages. The non-Russian speaker will have an extended resume in French, pp 168-293.
16. See R B Serjeant, "Societe et gouvernement en Arabie du Sud" [Society and Government in South Arabia], in ARABICA, October, 1967, p 286; Tudy Bernier, "Confederations et tribus du Sud de l'Arabie," in CAHIERS DE L'AFRIQUE ET l'Asie," 1st quarter, 1959, p 220; and Fred Halliday, "Counterrevolution in the Yemen," NEW LEFT REVIEW, September-October, 1970, p 7.



17. The classical approach is to present North Yemeni social structure as belonging to the caste system. Thus, the caste of the "'anadil," who hold jobs looked down on (butcher, barber, cobbler) are prohibited from bearing arms.
18. Walter von Dostal, op cit 00 8-9.
19. Joseph Chelhod, "L'organisation sociale au Yemen," ["Social Organization in Yemen"] in ETHNOGRAPHIE, 64, 1970, p 71.
20. Max Weber, "The Theory of Social and Economic Organization," New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. "Traditional authority rests on the established belief in the sacred character of the traditions handed down from time immemorial and in the legitimacy of the status of those who hold the instruments of authority."
21. In certain societies, notably in Africa, this kind of challenge is carried out by the use of magic or sorcery. See Georges Balandier, "Anthropologie politique" [Political Anthropology], Paris, PUF, 1969, p 78. This does not appear to apply to our object.
22. For all of South Arabia, a single case, already old, is known to us: that of the sultans of Lahej in the present People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden), noted by Tudy Bernier, op cit, p 221.
23. Among the works most usually mentioned we cite: Manfred W Wenner, "The Modern Yemen, 1918-1966," Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967, 257 pages; Dana Adams Schmidt, "Yemen: the Unknown War," New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1918, 316 pages; Edgar O'Balance, "The War in the Yemen," London, Faber and Faber, 1971, 218 pages; and Robert W Stookey, "Yemen: the Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic," Boulder, Westview Press, 1978, 322 pages.
24. In the view, among others, of the articles by M d'Ossad, "Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Intervention in Yemen," in ISRAEL LAW REVIEW, April, 1970, pp 216-248; Olivier Carre, "La ligue des Etats Arabes: [The Arab League], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, April, 1971, pp 344-355; Mohamed Jamal Gamil, "La politique etrangere contemporaine du Yemen" [Contemporary Foreign Policy in Yemen], Bordeaux, Universite de droit de Bordeaux, 1974, 62 pages; Stanko Guldescu, "War and Peace in Yemen," in QUEEN'S QUARTERLY, autumn, 1967, pp 472-488; and Noel Jeandet, "Les deux Republiques du Yemen et la confrontation Est-Ouest" [The Two Yemen Republics and the East-West Confrontation], in REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE, June 1975, pp 99-107.
25. Jean Lagadec, "Le conflit au Nord-Yemen: aspect de l'affrontement au sein du monde arabe" [The Conflict in North Yemen: an Aspect of the Clash Within the Arab World], Memoire for DES [Advanced Studies Diploma] in political science, Paris I, 1973, 150 pages; and "La fin du conflit Yemenite" [The End of the Yemeni Conflict] in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, April, 1974, pp 344-355.
26. In addition to the works of the previously mentioned author, we refer to those of Fred Halliday, "Arabia Without Sultans," London, Penguin Press, 1974, notably referring to the YAR on pp 81-150, and, by the same author, "Counter-revolution in the Yemen," op cit, pp 3-25; Georges Pasteur, "Yemen: unification

et affrontements" [Yemen: Unification and Struggle], in NOUVELLE CRITIQUE, February, 1973, pp 52-53; and Marc Pellas, "Yemen du Nord: la lutte des forces revolutionnaires" [North Yemen: the Struggle of the Revolutionary Forces], in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, August, 1973.

27. As was the case for the establishment of colonies in Black Africa. See Lancine Sylla, "Tribalisme et parti unique en Afrique noire" [Tribalism and the Single Party in Black Africa], Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977, pp 54-57.
28. Jean Lagadec, op cit, p 350.
29. By way of illustration we can appreciate these tribal and historical impacts on the third force by citing a short passage from the novel of al-Zubayri, "Masat Waq al-Waq." The author imagines a dialogue on democracy between the martyrs of contemporary tribes in heaven who "agree on a method for maintaining power. They ask that future governments resemble those in power at the time of Ma'in, Saba, and Himyar, when the tribes had a special council where all were represented and participated through the council in the exercise of power." Mentioned and translated in the work of Amrani (Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Amrani), "Al-Zubayri, le lettre revolutionnaire du Yemen: [Al-Zubayri, the Revolutionary Scholar of Yemen], Paris, Master's Thesis in Arabic, Universite de Paris IV, 1978, p 8.
30. Despite all the interest in these elections in a country largely dominated by tribal values, only a very short article by Nicholas Ashford, "Yemen Leader Explains Village Role in Country's First Election," in THE TIMES [of London], 6 January 1971, informs us of the development of the electoral campaign (despite the anecdotal and fragmentary aspect of the article).
31. According to Georges Pasteur, "Yemen: liberation nationale, unification et probleme de classe" [Yemen: National Liberation, Unification, and Class Problem], in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, April, 1973, p 98.
32. On this theme see Robert W Stookey, "Social Structure and Politics in the Yemen Arab Republic," in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, summer, 1974, pp 253-254.
33. "The concept of democracy today is no longer what it once was," stated President al-Hamdi (AL-THAWRA of 5 April 1977). In this connection the president decided to organize a "great people's congress," but the arrangements for the election of its members appeared more than hazy in the eyes of the masha'ikh and provoked their sharp reaction against the idea.
34. See Michel Tuchscherer, op cit, p 15.
35. This last idea was expressed by Yves Schemeil, "Les elites politiques au Proche-Orient [Political Elites in the Near East], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, June, 1978, p 568.
36. Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery: Essay in Macro-Sociology," Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975, 516 pages; and "Center and Periphery," in

"The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His Seventieth Birthday," London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, pp 117-131.

37. The term was suggested to us by Alfred Grosser at the time we were preparing our thesis.
38. A critique presented by Pierre Germion, "Le pouvoir peripherique: Bureaucrates et notables dans le systeme politique francais" [Peripheral Power: Bureaucrats and Prominent Personalities in the French Political System], Paris, Le Seuil, 1976, p 13.
39. Christian Robin, "Le pays de Hamdan et Hawlan Quda'a (Nord-Yemen) avant l'Islam," Paris, Third Cycle Thesis, 466 pages.
40. Walter von Dostal, op cit, pp 9-11.
41. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Modern World System," New York, London, Academic Press, 1974, 410 pages; "Sous-developpement et dependance" [Under Development and Dependence], ESPRIT, February, 1974, pp 211-240; and "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, September, 1974.
42. Bernard Corbineau, "Le dialogue euro-arabe; instance du nouvel order international (1973-1978)" [The Euro-Arab Dialogue: an Instance of the New International Order (1973-1978)], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, June, 1980, pp 560-598.
43. The rigidity of this paradigm has often been criticized. See Jean-Francois Bayart, "L'analyse des situations autoritaires: etude bibliographique" [The Analysis of Authoritarian Situations: a Bibliographic Study], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, June, 1976, p 486.
44. Particularly with Caid [qadi] 'Abd al-Karim Arashi holding power on an interim basis after the death of President Ghasmi and presently vice-president of the republic.
45. Yves Schemeil, op cit, p 541.

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